YOUNG MEN OF COLOR IN THE MEDIA: IMAGES AND IMPACTS

ROBERT M. ENTMAN

DELLUMS COMMISSION

BETTER HEALTH THROUGH STRONGER COMMUNITIES: PUBLIC POLICY REFORM TO EXPAND LIFE PATHS OF YOUNG MEN OF COLOR

THE DELLUMS COMMISSION
BETTER HEALTH THROUGH STRONGER COMMUNITIES:
PUBLIC POLICY REFORM TO EXPAND LIFE PATHS OF
YOUNG MEN OF COLOR

BACKGROUND PAPER

YOUNG MEN OF COLOR IN THE MEDIA: IMAGES AND IMPACTS

ROBERT M. ENTMAN

JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Although a few highly visible African Americans have reached positions of high status, income, and power in the United States, most blacks still live separately from whites, and significantly lag behind whites in terms of income, housing, health, and education.[1] Other non-white groups, including Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans, also rank lower than whites on many measures of living conditions and opportunities, and tend to live in ethnic enclaves. Of all those not classified as members of the dominant white group, young men of color (YMC) are particular objects of stereotyping, fear, anger, misunderstanding, and rejection. Indeed, public attitudes and emotions restrict their lives and keep them from enjoying the full range of opportunities and benefits of American society.

The way the media operate, the images they produce, and the influence they exert significantly affect the life chances of these young men. This report assesses the media's impacts, with a particular focus on the variety of ways they perpetuate negative impressions of young men of color, the reasons that this perpetuation of negative impressions occurs, and potential paths to reform and improvement. Specific issues covered here include:

1. **The negative biases in portraying YMC across most media—biases that are often subtle (and therefore difficult to notice and counteract), rather than blatant**

2. **The impacts of the negative images on whites, on white-dominated institutions, on politics and public policy, on society in general, and on YMC**

3. **Explanations for continuing biases despite improvements in the visibility and depictions of persons of color**

4. **Public and private policy changes that might reduce the deleterious influences of the media in this sphere and promote more positive contributions to the lives of YMC and to society at large**

Challenging and changing the media will be a vital component in the larger effort of the Joint Center Health Policy Institute to establish a "Fair Health" movement to provide people of color with equal opportunities for healthy lives. The connection

between cultural stereotypes and ignorance among the majority of white Americans on the one hand, and the treatment and life chances of non-whites on the other, is well established. People of color experience systematic discrimination in a range of areas, including the delivery of public education and other services, job hiring and promotion, housing opportunities, and treatment by the police and criminal justice system. All of these, in turn, affect individuals' physical and mental health. For instance, unemployment and underemployment take severe tolls on health, and discrimination makes unemployment and underemployment worse.[2] Compounding this problem, persons of color at every income level tend to receive inferior medical care compared with whites.[3]

The connection between the media and these negative interrelationships is this: the media are among the most powerful sources of mental impressions that people form of categories of out-groups. Thus, for instance, under ambiguous conditions, a white police officer—even a well-meaning one—may react differently to seeing a young man of color than to a white young man. That reaction—perhaps to shoot rather than waiting just one more moment to assess the situation—may be rooted in large part in a lifetime of exposure to media images that construct the prototypical YMC as more dangerous than the prototypical young white male.[4] Analogous reactions can arise from white teachers dealing with students of color, white doctors dealing with patients of color, and even, sadly, from some persons of color dealing with others of color.[5] Such is the generally unconscious power of the images in our minds—images often placed there or reinforced by the media.[6]

There are also aggregate-level effects from misperceptions held by the dominant white group, which frequently assumes that government programs in areas such as health or education are largely designed to help undeserving minorities at the expense of the majority.[7] Whites' misunderstandings are reflected in reduced public support for ameliorative programs, and the ensuing cuts in programs further diminish the health and other life conditions of YMC.

[1] See, for example, National Urban League 2005.

[2] cf. Levenstein, Smith, and Kaplan 2001.

[3] Smedley, Smith, and Nelson 2003.

[4] For experimental evidence of such behavior, see Greenwald, Oakes, and Hoffman 2003; Correll Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink 2002; Payne 2001.

[5] Rosenthal 1995; Shulman 1999.

[6] See Kang 2005 for a summary of evidence.

[7] See, for example, Iyengar 1991; Gilens 1999; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Hutchings and Valentino 2004.

In a variety of ways across the range of genres and outlets, the mass media convey impressions that whites occupy different moral universes from young men of color, who fundamentally diverge from whites.[8] The media do occasionally convey images of harmony and similarity.[9] Unfortunately, however, the impact of positive images may be swamped by the effects of the more common and vivid negative images, and by the effects of systematic omissions. People have an apparent tendency toward "remembering unfavorable behaviors associated with the out-group."[10] Also, they tend to "give too much weight to those individuals who confirm the stereotype and not enough weight to those who disconfirm the stereotype. This, in turn, implies that only a few stereotype-confirming individuals, against the background of many stereotype-disconfirming individuals, would nonetheless serve to maintain the stereotype."[11]

Raised in a culture in which race and ethnicity are often highly salient and white persons occupy the top of the social hierarchy, whites who have only limited personal experience with YMC may be more likely to remember the negative than the positive in the media images they encounter. More generally, psychologists have found that people remember negative information more readily than positive information.[12] Through their decisions regarding the images and information they include or omit, the media frequently encourage whites' tendencies to imagine, exaggerate, and misunderstand group differences. This holds especially true for young men of color, who bear the triple burden of the cultural stereotypes and negative emotions attached to the categories of non-white, young, and male.

Prior to addressing the main task of this report, some important caveats should be mentioned. Many distinctions have to be neglected. The multiple meanings of the very concepts of "race" and "ethnicity" raise endless complexities that cannot be

explored here.[13] Serious oversimplification occurs when the diverse cultures, nationalities, ethnicities, religions, and other distinctive attributes of those usually categorized as "Asian" or "Hispanic/Latino" are lumped together. The only attribute that "Asians" have in common is ancestry in countries ranging from Micronesia to Cambodia to Pakistan and many more. The only commonality among "Hispanics" or "Latinos" is that their parents or forebears use(d) Spanish—or perhaps Portuguese, French, or another language. For the growing numbers of those with multiracial or multiethnic identities, this ambiguity is even more apparent. Controversies that cannot be covered here have arisen over who gets to determine race and ethnicity. For instance, are "black" and "African American" synonymous terms? Some argue that only those whose ancestors were slaves in the U.S. are truly African American, and that only these people merit affirmative action.[14] The list goes on.

All of these complex and controversial issues must be radically simplified for the purposes of this report. Four categories of young men are used: black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, Asian or Asian American, and white.[15] This categorization should not present a significant problem since most studies of media images, stereotyping, and prejudice deal with these four general categories, and most political discussion and policy analyses also tend to use them. The bulk of these studies, however, have primarily focused on black persons, giving far less attention to other persons of color. As a result, this report unavoidably offers a more complete analysis of blacks than of other persons of color. This report's use of previous studies that focus on black persons also leads to what some might view as generalizations to all young men of color that are broader than warranted by incomplete data on groups aside from African Americans. For the same reason, the report cannot offer systematic comparisons of media depictions of black, Latino, Asian, and white young men, although where comparative data are available, they will be

---

[8] Since racial distinctions are heavily cultural, if not arbitrary, even writing about the media in terms of "race" and attributes like skin color has the pitfall of perpetuating the very distinctions that cause so many problems. This is simply unavoidable, however. Readers should keep in mind that sorting people, including young men, into so-called "races" based on skin color or other physical characteristics is neither scientifically accurate nor ethically acceptable.

[9] cf. Entman and Rojecki 2000, and the Annual NAACP Image Awards for positive media contributions, http://www.naacpimageawards.net/36thImageAwards/nominees.html.

[10] Rothbart and John 1993: 38.

[11] Rothbart and John 1993: 43-44; cf. Sampson 1999: 121-22.

[12] See Fiske and Taylor 1991; Rothbart and John 1993; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000.

[13] cf. Appiah and Gutmann 1996.

[14] See Rimer and Arenson 2004.

[15] Although many writers use "Latino/a" to simultaneously refer to males and females, given this report's focus on young men, the term "Latino" will be used and will be employed interchangeably with "Hispanic." The fact that many of Latin ancestry consider themselves to be black represents a further complicating consideration, but it is beyond the scope of the report (see Rivero 2002, however, for an interesting discussion of how the issue played out in a TV sitcom). Similar terminological issues exist with respect to labels for blacks/African Americans and for Asians/Asian Americans. To conserve space, these are ignored here.

Table 1: Racial/Ethnic Hierarchy Revealed in Negative Stereotyping

Violence	Prone	Neutral	Not prone	Unintelligent	Neutral	Intelligent	Lazy	Neutral	Hardworking
Blacks	47.0	37.5	15.5	21.9	48.5	29.6	34.3	43.7	22.0
Hispanics	37.4	44.1	18.5	23.9	50.8	25.3	21.9	40.3	37.8
Asians	16.9	46.5	36.6	10.5	39.7	49.8	10.9	31.9	57.2
Whites	21.4	47.9	30.7	6.7	40.9	52.4	10.8	43.3	45.9

Note: entries are percentages of respondents to 2000 National Opinion Research Center General Social Survey questions asking for ratings of each group on a scale of 1 to 7 for the following traits: violence-prone/not violence-prone; unintelligent/intelligent; and lazy/hardworking. The percentage responding with one of the three numbers toward the negative ends of the scale (1, 2, or 3 for violence and unintelligence, and 5, 6, or 7 for laziness) are listed in the left-hand column for each trait, followed by the percentage responding with the neutral answer (4), and then the percentage responding with one of the three numbers toward the positive ends of the scale.

mentioned. Finally, because there are so few identifiable Native American representations in the media, and so little research on stereotyping and prejudice toward young men of this group, they will not be covered here.[16]

Some data are available that illustrate the relative degree to which blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are subject to stereotypes. The University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center conducts its General Social Survey every two years, and in 2000, this survey included a series of questions about whether members of these groups, as well as whites, tend to be violence-prone, hardworking or lazy, and intelligent or unintelligent. Table 1 shows the results. It reveals a fairly clear hierarchy; blacks are at the bottom, followed by Hispanics, and Asians are equal to or surpass whites at the top. Respondents (who included members of all the groups in representative proportion to the U.S. population) rated blacks as considerably lazier than other groups and somewhat more violence-prone. Blacks and Hispanics were seen as less intelligent to about an equal degree relative to whites and Asians. While these are only three dimensions of stereotyped thinking and the matter is far more complicated than can be discussed here, this simple table provides a conservative estimate of the degree of stereotyping prevalent in the culture.[17] Because it is socially undesirable to answer such survey questions by revealing one's racial/ethnic biases, the prevalence of negative stereotyping is almost certainly greater than suggested in the table.

---

[16] See Weston (1996) for data and analysis revealing much the same syndrome affecting them.

[17] See especially Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1998.

## CULTURAL REPRODUCTION OF RACIAL/ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

In order to understand the impact of the media on young men of color and stereotyping, and on inter-group relations more generally, we should start with the sobering research of cognitive psychologists. This research demonstrates that responses to persons categorized according to race often happen *beneath conscious awareness and arise even when the respondent consciously rejects prejudice and stereotype.* Summarizing an enormous amount of research literature,[18] Kang writes:

> We map individuals to racial categories according to prevailing racial mapping rules, which in turn activates racial meanings that alter our interaction with those individuals. The mapping and activation are automatic, and the racial meanings that influence our interaction may be stereotypes and prejudice we explicitly disavow… And implicit bias has behavioral consequences, which can be deadly.[19]

Among the examples Kang[20] cites are studies showing that subjects are more likely to perceive minority persons as possessing weapons (even when they do not) and, as a result, are more likely to "shoot" them in experiments;[21] that equally qualified job applicants received 50 percent more call-backs when their résumés listed the name Emily (prototypically "white") rather than Lakisha ("black");[22] and that interview situations between whites and persons of color can be poisoned by nonverbal and other unconscious communication microbehaviors. As Kang writes: "The total impact of these interactional phenomena on education (admissions, mentoring), employment (hiring, promotion), social networking (friendship, marriage, collegiality), and market transactions (auto purchases, mortgages) cannot be overestimated."[23]

What are the cultural mechanisms that create this unfortunate situation? Figure 1 offers a graphic representation of the circu-

[18] Examples of which are Bargh 1996; Fiske 1998.

[19] Kang 2005: 1535; also see pp. 1500-08.

[20] Kang 2005: 1491-94.

[21] Correll et al. 2002; Payne, Lambert, and Jacoby 2002.

[22] Bertrand and Mullainithan 2004.

[23] Kang 2005: 1535-36.

Figure 1: Cyclical Reproduction of Racial/Ethnic Misunderstanding and Antagonism

lar processes by which racial and ethnic misunderstanding and antagonism are reproduced. Like all such representations, it is an abstraction and oversimplification. Its goal is to clarify the complex interrelationships among white elites and the institutions that they dominate; ordinary white citizens' sentiments, decisions, and behaviors; and the lives and life chances of persons of color. The relationships are dynamic and interactive, but the figure deliberately starts at the top of the power/status/wealth hierarchy with white elites and decision makers, dividing them into two segments for analysis: those in charge of media and those in charge of everything else. As illustrated, officials and business leaders make the decisions that shape public policies and societal conditions, while media leaders make decisions that shape the images appearing in newspapers, films, and other sources of entertainment and information—most particularly the images of young men of color.

These two sets of decisions, which shape "real world" conditions and media content, in turn influence the masses of ordinary white American citizens. For purposes of clarity, Figure 1 shows a box enclosed by dotted lines to highlight the ways that the thinking and behavior of the white majority affect persons of color. The solid-bordered box shows the four chief dimensions of white racial antagonism, which individual whites hold to a greater or lesser degree: stereotypes, denial, negative emotional reactions, and sense of inherent conflict of

Figure 2: Spectrum of Sentiments Toward Young Men of Color (YMC)

Dimension:	Comity	Ambivalence	Animosity	Racism
	Individual Diversity	**Negative Tendencies**	**Stereotyping**	**Racial Hierarchy**
Stereotyping	Individual YMCs, like whites, vary widely in traits	YMCs tend more than whites to exhibit negative traits	Most YMCs share a syndrome of negative traits	YMCs are a lower order of humanity than whites, with consistently negative traits
	Empathy	**Under-Estimation**	**Denial**	**Separation & Discrimination**
Structural discrimination	Discrimination remains prevalent, causing great harm to equal opportunity	Discrimination may occur in isolated individual instances	Anti-YMC discrimination is a thing of the past; whites now experience more racial discrimination	YMCs cannot attain equality no matter what society does; discrimination is therefore necessary
	Political Acceptance	**Political Concern**	**Political Rejection**	**Political Aggression**
Inherently conflicting group political interests (politics as zero-sum ethnic/racial game)	Fundamental interests of non-whites and whites do not differ; cooperation is possible and desirable	Non-white political power sometimes creates trouble for whites as a group; cooperation is suspect	Non-white political power extracts advantages at white expense; cooperation is rarely to mutual advantage	Non-white power poses grave dangers to whites as a group; cooperation is virtually race treason
	Comfort	**Disquiet**	**Fear & Anger**	**Hatred**
Emotional responses	Low intensity, positive or neutral feelings	Low intensity oscillation from neutral to positive to negative	Largely negative, moderately intense emotions	Intensely and globally negative emotions toward YMCs

Note: Adapted from Entman and Rojecki (2000), Table 2-1.

group interests. These four elements, detailed in Figure 2, are important because they will provide a framework for analyzing the nature and impacts of media.

Entman and Rojecki argue that white racial thinking spans a spectrum that runs from racial trust and understanding, or "comity," to ambivalence, then to animosity, and finally to outright racism, although the boundaries between the orientations are blurry.[24] Three largely cognitive dimensions of belief and one cognitive dimension of general emotional response determine where people fit along this continuum. For the purposes of this report, let us stipulate that one dimension taps the degree to which whites attribute *homogeneously negative stereotypical traits to young men of color*. The second belief component measures the degree to which whites *deny the existence of discrimination against YMC*. Denial of discrimination is perhaps the most politically significant because it is often sufficient for white opposition to progressive policy change. The third is the *degree to which whites see themselves as having group interests that conflict with those of persons of color*. The fourth dimension measures the *degree and direction of emotional responses to blacks, Latinos, or Asians as groups or individuals*. The four dimensions are correlated, but independent.

The graphical presentation in Figure 2 does not imply sharply demarcated boxes of thoughts and feelings. At the left end of the spectrum ("Comity")—reading down the left-hand column

of the figure—might be a white person who believes that a) one cannot generalize about YMC any more than one can generalize about whites; b) YMC are subject to continued and varied forms and legacies of discrimination; and c) white group interests do not necessarily exist as such, let alone clash with those of persons of color. At the same time, d) such whites also hold either neutral or positive feelings toward persons of color as individuals and as categories.[25] Approximately 20 percent of whites fall into the Comity category.

At the other end of the spectrum, another 20 percent or so are full-blown racists, who hold that human beings fall into natural and distinct racial categories akin to species, with identifying (negatively stereotyped) biological and behavioral traits that reliably distinguish individual members; that the races can be ranked in order of inherent ability and social desirability;[26] that those of other races have inherently conflicting interests with those of whites; and that discrimination is thus justifiable. In addition, racists tend to be animated by strongly negative emotions toward members of out-groups.

[24] Entman and Rojecki, 2000, from which Figure 2 is adapted.

[25] Also regrettably, but unavoidably, omitted from this report are stereotypes and prejudices that exist between non-white groups. These not only apply to relations between, for example, Asian Americans and Latinos, but also within these groups. The focus is on whites holding negative stereotypes and other forms of animosity because whites remain in charge of most institutions and thus wield by far the most power over the lives of YMC.

[26] cf. Goldberg 1993.

This leaves about 60 percent of whites between the two extremes. Given that whites are often ambivalent—although readily pushed by environmental stimuli toward animosity—complicated mixtures of sentiments are common. For example, a white person might view blacks as displaying generally negative traits, yet still acknowledge widespread discrimination, or may see great variety among Asian or Latino individuals, yet still consider Asian or Latino political activity a threat to the interests of whites and deny that much discrimination occurs. As already noted, many theorists believe that most whites consciously adhere to egalitarian ideals and regard themselves as non-racists, yet have unrecognized negative feelings and cognitive associations concerning persons of color, which can lead to prejudiced behavior.[27] This would place most of

down to stereotyping, denial, political rejection and demonization, and fearful, angry emotions. Such negative feelings are not typically as intense and central to the political and social worldview of those with racial animosity as they are for racists.

A white person can feel more or less animosity, depending on the particular information circulating in his or her environment and on current conditions. For example, a white person alone in a city at night might feel more fearful of an 18-year-old Asian American male than of a white person of the same age. Ambivalent whites can move toward animosity when inflamed by particular situations such as this one—as well as by media depictions. Such whites then become more receptive to coded campaign appeals designed to mobilize them into coalitions with

Figure 3: Hypothetical schema system among whites for young men of color—mental connections common in U.S. Culture

them at some point around ambivalence or animosity on the continuum.

Racial animosity represents an important step short of racism. Although those exhibiting animosity are often labeled as racists, they do not see a natural racial order that places whites on top and legitimizes discrimination. Rather, animosity consists of less intense and all-encompassing stands on the four dimensions. As indicated by the bold print in Figure 2, animosity boils

traditional racists.[28] In this sense, the fact that the majority of whites are not outright racists becomes less relevant to politics and the lives of YMC than the fact that so many can sometimes be induced to vote alongside racists.

Figure 3 illustrates a hypothetical mental map for a typical white person or for the dominant culture as a whole. Psychologists and other social scientists frequently label the associations

[27] For example, see Dovidio and Gaertner 1986; Bargh et al. 1996; cf. Kang 2005 for a full survey.

[28] cf. Goren 2003; Mendelberg 2001; Carmines and Layman 1998: 129; Kinder and Sanders 1996: Chapter 9; Jamieson 1992; Edsall and Edsall 1991.

diagrammed here as "schematic" and might call Figure 3 a representation of a schema system. Schemas are groups of concepts and associated evaluations and feelings. The map suggests the frequent associations made in the media between young men of color (mostly Latinos and African Americans) and stereotyped negative traits such as laziness, violence, and hypersexuality. These associations, in turn, stimulate emotional responses, as well as political responses, as illustrated in the red boxes. The concepts placed in the cloud shapes are those that the media do not frequently include. Since the culture infrequently validates these linkages, they are not as frequently encoded in the minds of white Americans.

Returning to Figure 1, notice how the four components of white racial thinking are manifested in four ways that directly and indirectly influence white elites as well as persons of color. When the environment stimulates whites' animosity or racism, their political thinking and behavior becomes more governed by stereotypes, denial, negative emotions, and a sense of conflicting group interests, as shown by research discussed below. These political sentiments and activities influence white politicians and policymakers. At the same time, racial thinking also influences whites' decisions as consumers, whether in choosing media products, or in selecting housing, transportation, and other goods and services. Of course, whites' behavior in the marketplace also influences the decisions of those leading major businesses and other institutions.

Two other important elements of white racial sentiments are shown in Figure 1. One involves direct impacts on persons of color: personal interactions between (and among) individuals of color and whites that occur in organizational settings, such as the workplace, or in places of business, such as restaurants, department stores, or hotels. The other concerns direct interpersonal communication between whites and persons of color who are not engaged in the structured relationships of a business or organizational setting. These may include everything from mere encounters of strangers on the street to acquaintanceships and friendships. A large volume of literature, mostly beyond the scope of this report, documents the experiences of persons of color with stereotyped and prejudicial thinking in contexts of organizational or interpersonal communication at work, in restaurants, and in seeking taxicabs.[29] Such experiences impose enormous psychic, physical, and financial costs on persons of color. The individual dimensions are included in the diagram because the interpersonal behaviors are themselves influenced by the messages and omissions of the media.

As suggested by the lower third of Figure 1, white leaders' decisions also naturally exert direct influences on persons of color through societal conditions (shown on the left-hand side) as well as media productions (shown on the right-hand side). In addition, of course, ethnic subcultures (including ethnically targeted media) also exert significant influences on persons of color. As all of these paths of influence converge to affect the life experiences and life chances of persons of color, the latter also have potential and actual power to influence the thinking and behavior of the mostly white leadership sector of society. This is indicated by the solid line running along the left-hand margin of the figure from persons of color to the white elite. With all of this said, the central focus of this report must be on the direct and indirect effects of the mainstream white-dominated *media* on ordinary whites, on the white leadership class, and on young males of color.

---

[29] See, for example, Feagin and Vera, 1991; Cose, 1993; cf. Hochschild 1995.

MEDIA PRODUCTS: STEREOTYPING, DENIAL, FEAR, AND REJECTION

Since the media rarely convey outright racist messages or stereotypes—indeed, in fiction and in the news, they regularly preach the explicit lesson that racism is bad—we must explore more subtle aspects of mediated communication to discern its crucial impacts. *Negative stereotyping* is a core component of media images of young men of color and an important force in reinforcing general racial antagonism or racism. The stereotypes arise not merely from the news, but from TV and film entertainment, advertising, and sports programming as well. Stereotyping and, equally important, the media's failure to challenge traditional stereotyped expectations, in turn, establish often unconscious mental connections for whites (and others), so that perceiving a YMC stimulates *negative emotions* such as fear and anger. The media contribute to the *denial* component of racial sentiments mostly by what they usually omit. Examples include: the pervasiveness of present-day discrimination and, given the importance of capital accumulation, the enormous financial harm still imposed today by discrimination against past generations; the role that poverty and joblessness play in raising crime rates and lowering marriage rates among YMC; and the part played by larger structural changes in the global economy.[30] These patterns of omission—along with the ways journalists tend to code much of politics as a zero-sum game in which those in the category "white persons" share common political interests *against* other categories of people—encourage whites to perceive an *inherent political conflict of interest* with persons of color.

Media stereotypes are recurring messages that associate persons of color with traits, behaviors, and values generally considered undesirable, inferior, or dangerous. We can start with the news. Both print and electronic journalism frequently connect the following concepts with YMC: crime, violence, hypersexuality, poverty (especially undeserving poverty—that is, poverty due to character flaws of the individual) and welfare. These reports not only stereotype the YMC who are featured in them, but they also reinforce negative emotions and a sense of social distance that may promote a belief in inherent group conflict. All of these can feed white support for policies counter to the interests of YMC.

The ways in which television and print news stereotype YMC—in particular, blacks and Latinos—as criminal and violent are varied and often rather subtle. Here are some examples from the extensive research literature:

- Violence and youth, especially male youth, are closely linked: most stories that feature young people on local news depict violence they commit or suffer, and in those stories, older white men are the dominant speakers. Local news does not often portray young persons as positively contributing to society.[31]

- One study found that blacks are twice as likely as white defendants to be subject to negative pre-trial publicity, and Latinos are three times as likely as whites.[32]

- In crime coverage more generally, whites are overrepresented as victims of violence and as law-enforcers, while blacks are underrepresented in these sympathetic roles.[33] In some areas, at least, Hispanics may receive even worse treatment than blacks. Chiricos and Eschholz found that one in 20 whites appearing on local TV news in Orlando were criminal suspects, compared with one in eight blacks and one in four Hispanics.[34]

- In some notorious, highly publicized crimes, such as the 1989 alleged rape of a wealthy young white woman in Central Park by a "gang" of Hispanic and black young men, YMC appear particularly susceptible to portrayals that associate them with extreme threat and less-than-human traits. Narratives routinely used such words as "savage" and "wild."[35]

- Studies of local news in Chicago and elsewhere suggest that depictions of black suspects (mostly young men) tend to be more symbolically threatening than those of whites accused of similar crimes. Black defendants in one study were more likely to be shown in mug shots. In the ubiquitous "perp walks," blacks were twice as likely as whites to be shown under some form of physical restraint by police—although all were accused of scary and generally violent crimes.[36] One complexity to note is that it may well be true that police officers physically restrain

---

[30] cf. Wilson 1996.

[31] Dorfman and Woodruff 1998.

[32] Dixon and Linz 2002.

[33] Dixon, Azocar, and Casas 2003; also see Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Romer, Jamieson, and de Coteau 1998.

[34] Chiricos and Eschholz 2002: 412-14.

[35] Welch, Price, and Yankey 2002.

[36] Entman and Rojecki 2000.

more black defendants than they restrain white defendants because of the cops' own racial fears. As suggested by the influence paths illustrated in Figure 1, news reports that may cultivate negative stereotyping and fear of YMC may also accurately convey aspects of the "real world." This consideration indicates that solving the problem may require more than simply urging journalists to report more accurately, as discussed further below.

Aside from crime, perhaps the most frequent and disproportionate association made with persons of color is poverty.[37] Clawson and Trice found that, in stories where poverty is a topic, newsmagazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek* overrepresent blacks, while underrepresenting whites, Hispanics, and Asians.[38] At the same time, the magazines overrepresent the non-working poor and the urban poor in their illustrations of poverty. In this way, the authors suggest, not only do the media encode poverty as an especially black trait, misreporting the ethnic diversity of the poor, but they undermine potential sympathy, especially among the white majority, for anti-poverty programs. After all, such expenditures appear to go mostly to groups with which whites do not readily identify. Similarly, Gilens shows that news stories about welfare policy use blacks in illustrations far in excess of their actual numbers as recipients and, in this way, reduce white support for welfare programs.[39]

As Entman and Rojecki note, poverty can be portrayed as a condition that merits sympathy, but it more often appears associated with threats in the form of crime, violence, drugs, gangs, and aimless activity.[40] Iyengar documented a tendency to represent poverty as the fault of poor individuals, rather than a consequence of social conditions.[41] A sense of inherent group conflict is thus established between taxpaying whites and seemingly tax-absorbing, undeserving persons of color, especially blacks. Showing the pervasiveness of the cultural association of poor and black, an unusual study by Clawson found that even *economics textbooks*, presumably written and edited by highly informed people, disproportionately employ pictures of blacks to illustrate analyses of poverty.[42]

Just as important as active stereotyping of persons of color as poor, if not criminal—and, in any case, not valuable to society—is the paucity of information about and images of young men of color who positively contribute to society and who live in accordance with values that match those of the dominant culture. As one example, studies of network television news reveal that few persons of color are used as expert sources.[43] In a 1997 sample, black experts spoke 14 times, compared with white experts, who provided 496 sound bites.[44] Black sources predominantly appeared in stories about sports, entertainment, and crime. In an exhaustive study of 639 hours of network news, Subervi found a similar dearth of Latino sources, except in the 0.82 percent of stories that were about Latinos.[45] And, as already noted, in local TV news, where sensational reporting of crime involving YMC is a prime ingredient, persons of color are underrepresented relative to their actual numbers among the law-enforcement officers trying to keep society safe. Subervi, however, offers evidence that Latino members of the military were portrayed as heroes and patriots in some network news stories, and that they tended to be portrayed more as victims than perpetrators in network stories on crime.[46]

Meanwhile, there is some evidence that African American office holders, politicians, and political activists face systematic biases in the media. Niven found that black members of Congress implicated in the House banking scandal of 1992 received more prominent coverage, more negative treatment, and more coverage overall than white members.[47] Similarly, Schaffner and Gadson found that African American members of Congress are framed in terms of their racial identities, as if their concerns are mainly focused on race-related issues.[48] Reeves documented a variety of ways in which black candidates are disadvantaged relative to white candidates, and Entman and Rojecki have shown how journalists seem to focus disproportionate attention on the "leaders" of the "black community" (both of which are problematic concepts) whose speeches or actions are sensationally controversial and likely to stir up whites' feelings of inherent political conflict.[49]

[37] Entman 1995; Gilens 1996; Entman and Rojecki 2000.

[38] Clawson and Trice 2000.

[39] Gilens 1999.

[40] Entman and Rojecki 2000.

[41] Iyengar 1991.

[42] Clawson 2002.

[43] Entman and Rojecki 2000; cf. Dixon, Azocar, and Casas 2003.

[44] Entman and Rojecki 2000: 68.

[45] Subervi 2004.

[46] Subervi 2004.

[47] Niven 2004.

[48] Schaffner and Gadson 2004.

[49] Reeves 1997; Entman and Rojecki 2000.

The Million Man March, led by Louis Farrakhan and others, is a case in point. Watkins showed that television news coverage focused heavily on Farrakhan and his deviance from accepted norms of political discourse.[50] Dan Rather on CBS described him as "the man some have labeled the pied-piper of hate."[51] The news coverage linked him to black racism and threats on whites by showing, for instance, old sound bites of his incendiary rhetoric, sometimes contrasting it with the more acceptable speech of Martin Luther King, Jr.[52] At the same time, and somewhat contradictorily, there was evidence that mainstream media coverage underestimated the numbers of marchers.[53] Amana summarized his analysis of the news coverage of the march by observing that the concentration on Farrakhan "elevated him to a status he might not actually deserve… In the process, [the media] also missed the real story: the complexity of pride, pain, frustration, determination, love and the will to survive of African American men and women everywhere in this country."[54]

As opposed to Farrakhan, a handful of (usually non-elected) black, Latino, and Asian office-holders have received considerable positive coverage—perhaps most notably, former Secretary of State Colin Powell and current Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. Still, whereas the media have many opportunities to construct positive role models for YMC and counter-stereotypical exemplars for the white majority, in practice, journalists focus on a tiny handful of celebrity leaders—and may relish (and embellish) stories of misbehaving minority politicians even more than they do scandals involving whites.

Negative stereotyping and a general paucity of positive images are, of course, not limited to the news media. Scholarly research reveals a variety of ways in which fictional depictions of YMC promote negative sentiments. As with news, stereotypes can be reinforced by the absence, as well as the presence, of certain language or visual images. In dramatic Hollywood movies, for instance, whites play the lead roles nine times more often than non-whites; in action/adventure films and comedies, the disparity comes down to a ratio of three to one.[55] Prime-time entertainment on TV has been subject to years of criticism for giving persons of color starring roles in few shows, except for those featuring mostly non-white casts; for stereotyping blacks and Latinos; and for granting little visibility at all to Asian Americans.[56]

Blacks appear more acceptable in roles involving physical action or buffoonery than in those that rely upon close audience identification with a complicated, dramatic problem faced by a main character.[57] Studies of film roles filled by African Americans also suggest that they tend to be employed in occupations of lower prestige and to behave in more traditionally "macho" ways relative to whites, who rate higher on intellectuality.[58] Latinos and Asians are primarily distinguished by their absence from starring roles and by a tendency to fill stereotyped niches.[59] Asians feature prominently as martial artists or technology geeks.[60] Hispanics in fictional entertainment are typically cast in roles such as a criminal, a highly sexual woman, an indolent employee, a dim-witted sidekick, an alien foreigner, or a less-than-human animal.[61]

Black actors—mostly males, but occasionally females—have also frequently occupied a role dubbed by African American director Spike Lee as "the magical Negro."[62] In such roles, the black character helps the white lead actor with spiritual matters, folk wisdom, or romance and sex—but not with intellectual puzzles. Recent examples include Cuba Gooding, Jr.'s role in "Jerry Maguire," Will Smith's roles in "Hitch" and "The Legend of Bagger Vance," and Morgan Freeman's roles in "Bruce Almighty" (playing God) and "Shawshank Redemption." Meanwhile, African American women are, relative to white counterparts, offered far fewer starring roles and are far more likely to engage in sexually provocative and promiscuous behavior and profane language, as exemplified by Halle Berry's Oscar-winning performance in "Monster's Ball."[63] This is not to say that actors of color never play intellectually adept and well-rounded characters; but such representations are

---

[50] Watkins 2001.

[51] Watkins 2001: 94.

[52] Watkins 2001: 95-96.

[53] Rice 1996.

[54] Amana 1995.

[55] Eschholz et al. 2002: 315.

[56] See Baynes 2003: Sec. V for a summary of the research here; also Children Now 2004.

[57] See Shohat and Stam 1994; Bogl, 2003; Eschholz, Bufkin, and Long 2002.

[58] Eschholz, Bufkin, and Long 2002.

[59] Ríos and Mohamed 2003; Mayer 2004.

[60] Wu 2001.

[61] Bender 2003.

[62] Kempley 2003.

[63] See also Guerrero 1994; Entman and Rojecki 2000.

comparatively rare, especially in movies that reach large white audiences.

Nonetheless, it may be argued that positive messages appear more frequently in television and film fiction than in the (non-fictional) news. Entman and Rojecki write that African Americans in particular are sometimes assigned ambiguously positive supervisory roles in TV dramas, exercising authority over whites, as well as other persons of color.[64] On the one hand, these characters are usually superbly competent and hardworking, and therefore undermine important negative stereotypes. On the other hand, however, they are often isolated from their peers in the fictional workplace and their personalities are emotionally distant—the characters evoke little identification or empathy, and the plots tend to neglect their lives outside of work in comparison with their white co-stars. Examples include Dr. Benton on "ER" and Lt. Fancy on "NYPD Blue." The more recent "Grey's Anatomy" may offer a partial, though problematic, exception.[65]

In primetime crime dramas, research is mixed. Mastro and Robinson found that police were significantly more likely to use excess force on minority youth than on white youth.[66] In addition, they found that the police use force twice as often in the dramas as they do in real life, which may fuel tension in real-world police encounters with YMC, who might be led by television programs to expect the police to behave violently. Using different methods, Tamborini et al. found positive representations of both black and Hispanic characters involved in the criminal justice system, although overall, few Hispanics and Asians were represented at all.[67]

Sports coverage is an arena for generating what might be considered positive stereotypes of blacks (and perhaps Latinos), since young men of color dominate the star roles. Saying or implying that a group's members possess innately superior athletic abilities, however, comes dangerously close to endorsing a biology-based view of race. Such a conviction forms a core component of outright racism. In fact, Bruce summarizes studies showing that sportscasters commonly make this connection between blacks and natural athleticism, while also bestow-

ing significantly less praise on blacks for hard work and intellect than they do on white stars.[68] Other research has shown that athletes of color seem to receive more intense coverage when they break the law or social norms.[69] Bruce also shows that blacks and Latinos are more likely to be called only by their first names. Yet, rather than connoting disrespect for the YMC, Bruce argues that quite the opposite is true: only the biggest stars get to be called "Michael" (Jordan) or "Tiger" (Woods).[70] If YMC dominate many sports, they will naturally receive first-name honors more often.

A few athletes of color certainly do achieve widespread admiration, if not veneration, as measured by their incomes from commercial endorsements, and whites seem generally content with rooting for and watching teams dominated by YMC. All in all, it is difficult to determine the impact of the varied messages about YMC seemingly constructed in sports television—perhaps they add up to encouragement of white ambivalence.

Finally, consider the arena of advertising. In their study of primetime television commercials that depict computers, Kinnick, White, and Washington conclude that the ads:

> clearly represent the world as seen from a white perspective. Whites encounter people of color in the workplace and see them in their children's schools, but not in family settings. They see them primarily in subordinate positions, unless the person is a media celebrity or sports star. They see nonwhites using computers less than whites, and white males holding a virtual monopoly on positions requiring technological expertise. The composite picture presented by images of computer use in television commercials is a distorted mirror, which tends to reflect negatively on women and nonwhites and more positively on white males.[71]

Henderson and Baldasty, and Entman and Rojecki came to virtually identical conclusions.[72] Although it is difficult to research the depictions of Latinos without resorting to use of stereotyped appearance norms that do not match the diversity of Latino looks, commercials now appear to be ethnically diverse. Nonetheless, a clear hierarchy develops that matches

---

[64] Entman and Rojecki 2000.

[65] See Fogel 2005.

[66] Mastro and Robinson 2000.

[67] Tamborini et al. 2000.

[68] Bruce 2004: 861.

[69] Rainville and McCormick 1977; Jackson 2004.

[70] Bruce 2004: 869.

[71] Kinnick, White, and Washington 2001.

[72] Henderson and Baldasty 2003; and Entman and Rojecki 2000.

and reinforces the culture's preference for whites as the ideal type of person. For instance, persons of color mostly appear in background roles, rather than starring in the commercials.[73] Blacks in particular rarely appear prominently in ads for luxury and fantasy products (perfume, upscale cars, and credit cards), but do often appear in association with low-end consumer items (fast food, discount stores, and household cleaning products). Kinnick, White, and Washington offer excellent data on young men of color, revealing subtle derogation of black and Asian young men, and a preference for women of color over men:

> The fact that African American and Asian women outnumber men in the role of "boss" suggests that casting directors have avoided casting minority males in positions of authority, presumably because either 1) minority women represent a "two-fer," allowing the advertiser to show both gender and racial diversity in one character; 2) a belief that nonwhite men would not be "believable" in these roles; or 3) because minority women are perceived as less threatening by advertisers who wish to avoid alienating the white male consumer.[74]

Since commercials are carefully cast, scripted, and directed, there is little doubt that their content reflects the perceptions of the advertising agencies and their clients regarding the preferences of the marketplace.[75]

---

[73] Henderson and Baldasty 2003: Entman and Rojecki 2000.

[74] Kinnick, White, and Washington 2001.

[75] Music videos represent young men of color, especially blacks, in ways that often confirm traditional stereotypes of black males as violent, hypersexual, irresponsible, and intellectually inferior. See, for example, McWhorter 2001; although cf. Dyson 1996 for a defense of rap and hip-hop music.

MEDIA EFFECTS ON WHITES

These linkages between negative qualities and young men of color, and their general exclusion from more positive associations, have documented impacts on whites. One area of particular interest arises from the heavy representation of blacks and Latinos in crime news. Researchers have probed the effects on whites' fearfulness of crime and their tendencies to support punitive public policies such as capital punishment and mandatory long sentences. Gilliam and Iyengar used experimental and survey studies to show that exposure to images of young black male criminal defendants increased whites' punitive attitudes toward crime as well as their tendencies to endorse racist beliefs (such as the belief that blacks are less intellectually able).[76] Other studies show an interaction between media exposure and the ethnic composition of the community: in areas where whites perceive that significant proportions of their neighbors are black or Hispanic, heavy viewers of news, "reality," and/or fictional crime shows are markedly more fearful of crime.[77] Two studies suggest that Hispanics are more feared than blacks, at least in areas with substantial Latino populations.[78]

The media images—and other political and cultural forces—that cultivate racialized fear and prejudice influence public policies. Soss and his colleagues show that whites' racial sentiments are strongly related to their level of support for the death penalty.[79] Furthermore, residential proximity heightens this effect. In the presence of large populations of blacks, whites' racial antagonism is particularly associated with high support of the death penalty. If such a strong yet simple equation between violent crime and YMC were not made in the media and in our culture, such a relationship would not emerge. After all, murder is murder, and capital punishment does not inherently implicate race. Nonetheless, historical study reveals clear relationships among support for capital punishment, racial attitudes, and the racial composition of different states.[80] On the other side of the ledger, Weitzer and Tuch show that blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to support police reform policies, in part because of their greater attention to media reports of police misconduct and the greater extent of their direct experience with it.[81]

One of the most striking topics of research in this area further confirms the idea, discussed earlier, that stereotype-based cognitive and emotional responses often get automatically, quickly, and unconsciously triggered, and go on to affect a wide range of sentiments. Using the "shooting" experiments mentioned earlier, Payne cleverly revealed the interaction between these experimental results and media images.[82] His important research shows that the shooting bias results from the mental linkage of black males to guns—a connection cemented by vivid media images—rather than generalized racial prejudice against blacks.

In a very different context, Valentino found that experimental subjects responded to TV news stories that included brief shots of black, Hispanic, or Asian criminal suspects by lowering their ratings of President Clinton—*even though the stories did not mention Clinton or his policies*.[83] Presumably, the widespread publicity about Clinton's sympathies for persons of color made white subjects think of him when they perceived crime committed by a YMC. The 1988 Bush presidential campaign took advantage of whites' tendencies to automatically associate black and Latino young men with crime and fear in its infamous "Willie Horton" and "Revolving Door" political advertisements.[84]

In a recent study, Hurwitz and Peffley showed that by merely inserting the words "inner city" in a survey question about spending money on prisons as opposed to antipoverty programs, whites' racial thinking was stimulated to the point that "racial conservatives" (what the present report would consider as white ambivalence or animosity) became more punitive, favoring prisons over antipoverty programs.[85] The mental association between the term "inner city" and threatening persons of color is apparently so strong that visual images (such as those in George H. W. Bush's 1988 campaign spots) or explicit racial labels are not even needed to generate an effect on whites.

Entirely outside a political context, the classic experiment conducted by Bargh et al. showed that even exposure to a subliminal screen flash of a black face was sufficient to heighten whites' levels of hostility when they were confronted with a frustrating, but completely non-racial, situation (a computer crash).[86] Using brain imaging technology, Cunningham et al. revealed that

[76] Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000: 568-71; cf. Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004.

[77] Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001; Eschholz, Chirico, and Gertz 2003; Matei, Ball-Rokeach, and Qui 2001; although cf. Gross and Aday, 2003.

[78] Chircos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001; Matei, Ball Rokeach, and Qui 2001.

[79] Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003.

[80] Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003. See also Niven 2002 on the complexities of public sentiments toward the death penalty.

[81] Weitzer and Tuch, 2004: 409-12.

[82] For the "shooting" experiments, see Correll et al. 2002; Payne 2001.

[83] Valentino 1999; cf. Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997.

[84] Mendelberg 2001; Jamieson 1992; see also Oliver 1999.

[85] Hurwitz and Peffley 2005.

[86] Bargh et al. 1996.

such a subliminal black stimulus "lights up" the amygdala, the portion of the brain that is particularly sensitive to fear.[87] The study also obtained measures of implicit prejudice (the Implicit Association Test, or IAT)[88] and discovered that "the more implicit negativity toward blacks relative to whites that participants showed on the IAT, the greater their amygdala activity for black relative to white faces in the 30-ms [subliminal] condition."[89] When the stimulus was consciously noticeable, however, whites' responses were inhibited: "when participants had the opportunity to process black and white faces for 525 ms (and reported seeing the faces), we observed activity differences not in the amygdala, but in areas… associated with inhibition, conflict, and control."[90] The physiological basis of fearful or anxious automatic responses of whites to black faces may well be rooted in evolutionary needs—high sensitivity to differing group identities once conferred survival advantages. This evidence, however, also supports the notion that negative associations with black persons, repeated vividly across the mass media, resonate quite deeply in the brain.[91]

In light of that point, let us conclude this section on impacts upon whites and society at large by exploring how whites vastly overestimate the numbers of non-whites living in the U.S. For example, the average respondent to Gallagher's study of white residents of Georgia estimated the black population at 32 percent, the Asian population at 15 percent, and the white population at just 49.9 percent (it appears that there were no separate estimates of Hispanics).[92] The actual figures are closer to 12.5 percent black, 70 percent white, and 12.6 percent Hispanic, with Asians, including Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans making up the remaining percentage. Similar overestimates of persons of color and underestimates of the white population have been found in previous studies.[93] Whites who live in states with less than one percent black populations are no less likely to overestimate than those in states with black populations of 20 percent or higher. Gallagher probed for the bases of his subjects' estimates and came up with these explanations—all of which involve the media:

1) Overrepresentation of blacks on local TV news and in sports coverage (discussed above).

2) Blacks' vocal demands for equality and embodiment of identity politics.[94]

3) Widely circulated reports that whites will become a minority group given current demographic trends.[95]

The tendency to see persons of color as already imperiling white domination of the U.S. easily fits with many whites' denial of discrimination and sense of inherent group political conflict. There is power in numbers, according to this perhaps unconscious reasoning; thus, if anything, whites should now be experiencing as much discrimination as non-whites (which most whites do believe).[96] For whites exhibiting ambivalence, animosity, or racism, the belief that persons of color have as many votes as white people could heighten the latter's sense of identification with their own group's (increasingly threatened) interests. Evidence supporting this possibility is provided by a study by Barker and Giles, which examines the impact of growing "Latino vitality" on whites' attitudes.[97] By "vitality" Barker and Giles mean growing "economic control, political control, wealth, power, and increasing demographic presence."[98] They found that whites who perceive increasing vitality in their state's Latino community and diminishing vitality (and thus power, wealth, and status) of Anglos tended to favor English-only policies. Such policies arguably embody symbolic political aggression against Latino culture—a kind of statement against an out-group that whites perceive as having interests that conflict with their own. The policies, such as one enacted in California in 1998 (Proposition 227), also impose substantive burdens on persons who are not native English speakers.[99]

---

[87] Cunningham et al. 2004.

[88] See Greenwald et al. 1998.

[89] Cunningham et al. 2004: 810.

[90] Cunningham et al. 2004: 812

[91] Such studies have apparently not been conducted on reactions to persons of color other than blacks.

[92] Gallagher 2003.

[93] Nadeau and Niemi 1993.

[94] See Entman and Rojecki 2000: Chapters 5, 7, and 8, demonstrating how news tends to exaggerate and distort black political demands and the sense of zero-sum group conflict, particularly in covering affirmative action and black politicians.

[95] Gallagher 2003: 391-92.

[96] cf. Schuman et al. 1998.

[97] Barker and Giles 2002.

[98] Barker and Giles 2002: 364.

[99] Barker and Giles 2002: 366; cf. Wright 2004, on Asian (Cambodian) immigrants.

MEDIA EFFECTS ON YOUNG MEN OF COLOR

As suggested in Figure 1, these mediated images have many impacts on young men of color that work through their effects on white leaders and white citizens. These are people whose decisions on everything from hiring, to granting bank loans, to teaching or medically treating YMC, to voting for officials who make public policies, are influenced by their conscious and unconscious racial views. In turn, those policies have important effects on the relationships, careers, and physical and psychological health of men of color during their youth and throughout their lives. There are well-known, self-reinforcing connections that link together under-funded schools in minority neighborhoods, the disappearance of jobs from the same communities due to global and domestic outsourcing, discrimination by employers who assume that YMC applicants are unreliable, higher rates of crime, lower rates of marital stability, and higher levels of medical problems (including premature death). The argument made here is that—among many underlying causes— media images play an integral role in perpetuating these vicious circles (as suggested in Figure 1). The media representations also exert direct and perhaps surprising influences upon the thinking and emotions of YMC themselves.

Johnson, Trawalter, and Dovidio studied the effects of violent rap music on attitudes toward blacks.[100] Exposure to violent rap made *both* black and white experimental subjects regard blacks as more violence-prone and less qualified for jobs. This and other research has found a surprising degree of agreement with ethnic and racial stereotypes among members of the groups themselves. Agreement with stereotypes could have a somewhat different twist for persons of color; for instance, a Hispanic agreeing that Hispanics are violence-prone could well think this tendency entirely justified as a response to generations of colonialist oppression, and could also believe that whites would be even more violent under similar conditions.

Claude Steele, however, has offered a series of important analyses demonstrating the corrosive effect that internalization of stereotypes can have on persons of color. His work reveals that media and cultural stereotypes of intellectual inferiority affect actual performance by black students on tests.[101] He demonstrated this by giving the same test to an experimental group and a control group. Members of the former group were told that they were taking a test of intellectual ability; the latter group was told that the test was not a test of intellectual ability. Black students scored lower in the experimental condition. Steele calls

this phenomenon "stereotype threat," suggesting that anxiety about behaving in a way that conforms to negative expectations actually does diminish performance among students of color.[102] Shmader and Jones suggest that stereotype threat operates by reducing the working memory capacity of stigmatized individuals, which would predict wide-ranging effects on YMC.[103] Thus, deterioration in performance could occur when blacks or Hispanics are called upon to speak in class or in a business meeting, or when Asian applicants (who generally do not suffer from stereotypes of intellectual incompetence, but do encounter expectations of *social* incompetence) go on job interviews.

Indeed, the differences in media stereotypes of young black, Latino, and Asian men, and the effects of these differences, is an area that cries out for more systematic research.[104] Scholars have documented the stereotype of Asian American males as a "model minority"—diligent, scientifically inclined, somewhat passive, and nerdy.[105] The Asian American stereotypes form a stark contrast to the stereotypes of young African American males as lazy, unintelligent, violent, and cool. Yet, as suggested by the stereotype threat phenomenon, both impose costs on a YMC's self-image, identity, and life chances.

---

[100] Johnson, Trawalter, and Dovidio 2000.

[101] For example, see Steele 1997.

[102] cf. McKown and Weinstein 2003 on developmental impacts of this process.

[103] Shmader and Jones 2003.

[104] One example would be Fox (2004), who compares the relative degree of stereotyping of blacks and Latinos as lazy, showing how whites' attitudes toward both groups affect their support for welfare spending; also see Kinnick, White, and Washington 2001; Ríos and Mohamed 2001.

[105] See Paek and Shah 2003; Kwak 2004; other aspects of Asian stereotypes, however, are more sinister: Locke 1998; Wu 2001; Lin 2002.

VIOLENCE, MEDIA, AND YOUNG MEN OF COLOR

A major, though somewhat separate, area of social scientific research has explored the effects of violent images in the media on actual aggressive or violent behavior. Given the perceived and actual association of YMC, particularly blacks and Latinos, with crime and violence, these studies become relevant. The U.S. National Television Violence Study reveals that 61 percent of programs contain violence—with 54 percent of programs containing lethal violence—whereas just four percent of shows had an anti-violence theme. Only 16 percent showed long-term negative consequences of violence. In nearly half of the programs, violent offenders went unpunished, and 71 percent of violent scenes showed no criticism or remorse for the violence.[106] Longitudinal studies reveal a significant association between viewing television violence during childhood and aggressive (and sometimes criminal) behavior in early adulthood.[107] Meta-analysis of large numbers of experimental studies shows relationships between exposure to TV violence and aggressive behavior in the aftermath of viewing, with a more pronounced effect among boys than girls.[108] To put the statistical magnitude of the effect of TV violence into a public health context, it is comparable to or larger than the effect of condom use on HIV risk, the effect of exposure to passive smoke in the workplace on lung cancer,[109] or the effect of aspirin use on heart attack risk.[110]

Although statistical associations between television (and film) viewing and aggressive behavior have been repeatedly found, however, the causal relationship between the two is somewhat more controversial. This controversy arises because so many other factors are at work, including the young person's family environment and psychological predispositions. For example, regarding the impact of video games, Gentile et al. suggest that more hostile adolescents get into more fights and also tend to play violent video games, which further heightens their aggressive behavior.[111] There is undoubtedly a vicious circle between aggression and the consumption of violent media: use of violent media, including video games, as well as television and film, causes aggressive feelings and behavior, and these, in turn,

feed still more use of violent media.[112] It is probable that a majority of scholars would agree with the following conclusion of Anderson et al:

> Research on violent television and films, video games, and music reveals unequivocal evidence that media violence increases the likelihood of aggressive and violent behavior in both immediate and long-term contexts. The effects appear larger for milder than for more severe forms of aggression, but the effects on severe forms of violence are also substantial… Recent large-scale longitudinal studies provide converging evidence linking frequent exposure to violent media in childhood with aggression in later life, including physical assaults and spouse abuse.[113]

The impact of violent media on the most serious forms of violence, such as murder, remains unclear, however. Even on the lesser forms of aggression, a somewhat more cautious approach also has scholarly adherents, including Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis, who argue that evidence of longer-term impacts and influence on teenagers and on criminal violence is inconsistent.[114]

On balance, there seems to be little doubt that violence in the media has some kind of significant deleterious impact on society through its apparent tendency to stimulate aggressive thoughts and behavior in habitual users. There is also evidence that exposure to media violence, especially in video games, may desensitize users to real-world violence.[115] Moreover, top-selling video games themselves are characterized not only by violence, but also by racial (and gender) stereotypes.[116] In addition, there is growing evidence that involvement with violent media content, including video games, may, in fact, have physiological effects on brain functioning that promote aggressive behavior.[117]

Equally important for the purposes of this report is evidence indicating that watching violent television and playing violent video games negatively affects what Kronenberger et al. and other psychologists call "executive functioning."[118] Accord-

---

[106] Summarized in Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis 2005: 703.

[107] Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis 2005: 703.

[108] Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis 2005: 704.

[109] Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis 2005: 704.

[110] Anderson et al. 2003: 81.

[111] Gentile et al. 2004.

[112] Slater et al. 2003.

[113] Anderson et al. 2003: 81.

[114] Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis 2005: 702.

[115] Funk et al. 2004.

[116] Children Now 2001.

[117] Kronenberger et al. 2005: 726.

[118] Kronenberger et al. 2005.

ing to Kronenberger et al., executive functioning "involves the ability of the individual to inhibit, regulate, direct, plan, and execute behavior," including such things as the ability to develop good study habits, and plan for course assignments, tests, and the like.[119]   Further, these authors state: "deficit in the executive functioning area is likely to underlie impulsive, poorly planned… behavior."[120]   In other words, violent media content may not only reinforce tendencies to behave violently, but may also undermine a young person's (particularly, perhaps, a young male's) ability to succeed in school or in the workplace. Such failures can, in turn, lead to downward spirals of negative treatment and negative feedback from authorities, which diminish the self-esteem, confidence, and motivation of a young man of color—as well as reinforcing the authority figure's application of stereotyped expectations to the youth.

The potential of mediated violence to cause damage may thus be especially acute for young people of color. In the words of Levin and Carlsson-Paige:

> The violent programs themselves, as well as the toys,
> video games, and other products linked to them,
> glorify violence, undermine play, and portray racial
> stereotypes. While these practices harm all young
> children, they present a special risk for children of
> color because of how racial messages are linked to
> violence in the shows. This situation is especially
> worrisome for young children of color who are
> disproportionately represented among low-income
> children, consume more hours of media per day,
> and have many other risk factors undermining their
> healthy development.[121]

---

[119] Kronenberger et al. 2005: 726.

[120] Kronenberger et al. 2005: 726.

[121] Levin and Carlsson-Paige 2003: 427.

EXPLAINING NEGATIVE MEDIA IMAGES

As suggested in Figure 1, all of the forces shaping media content operate simultaneously, so it is both inadvisable and impossible to single out one or two key causes—and difficult, as well, to come up with easy solutions. As the diagram indicates, media content, whether news, entertainment, or advertising, reflects the interactions of *marketplace* forces, including consumer demand and intense competition; the *professional values and cognitive and emotional habits and limitations* of media decision-makers—those creating and distributing the material, including executives, writers, editors, producers, directors, and actors; *actual societal realities*; and *political pressures and government policy*. The latter factor will be covered in the next section; here the report concentrates on the complicated interactions of the market, media decision-makers, and social realities.

Everything starts and ends in the marketplace, since most of the U.S. media are owned by corporations and publicly traded on the stock market—which means that they are legally and economically pressured to maximize profits.[122] The importance of *marketplace pressures* cannot be overstated, especially in an era of ever-intensifying competition among proliferating media outlets (including the Internet). In the realm of news, Hamilton, although not writing specifically about the media and persons of color, offers a comprehensive explanation for the declining quality of so much print and electronic journalism.[123] He writes: "If broadcasters internalized the benefits of hard news (such as better informed voters) to society, they would be more likely to offer hard news fare."[124] Instead, he continues, news markets yield:

> underconsumption of news about public affairs; inadequate investment in developing or reporting hard news; a bias in broadcasting against high-cost news programs or those that deliver information valued by a minority of viewers; the tilt toward satisfying the information demands of viewers or readers most valued by advertisers… the possibility that journalist herding will cause reporters to go with common wisdom rather than developing their own takes on stories; or the potential for conglomerate owners to view news provision solely thru the lens of profit maximization.[125]

All of this spells bad news for those hoping that news organizations will invest in the kind of costly, demanding journalism that might help reduce their inadvertent contributions to racial animosity. Although the underproduction of truly edifying news could be regarded as a classic market failure requiring government regulation or other forms of intervention, such steps are highly unlikely in the deregulatory climate promoted by the very same dominant media organizations (this point is discussed further below).

In journalism and in the media more broadly, market pressures push toward simple, sensational, titillating, and emotionally gratifying productions, rather than those that might provoke guilt or anxiety—or even too much thought. Such challenging and useful material does appear, but relatively little becomes available in comparison with the enormous avalanche of mediocre films, TV shows, and news coverage. At the same time, much of the higher quality material produced reaches only a tiny minority of the audience. Furthermore, competition heightens pressures to maximize revenue and minimize cost and risk. Among other things, the market works to reduce the quality and quantity of broadcast entertainment and news that is tailored to minority audiences. As Napoli demonstrates, for instance, advertisers regard audiences of color as less valuable than whites of the same income level.[126] Willing to pay less for the attention of persons of color, advertisers channel less revenue to producers of minority-targeted programming. Beyond that, as noted below, media aiming to maximize their revenues by maximizing the size of their mass audiences will tend to neglect the tastes of persons of color in order to concentrate on the more valued white consumers.

Market pressures themselves do not necessarily give completely transparent guidance to decision-makers, who must interpret consumer and advertiser tastes and demands. The professional values of journalists and producers of entertainment and advertisements usually include unwritten and poorly examined assumptions about audiences and advertisers, and about professional responsibilities that are informally handed down from generation to generation among practitioners. Of course, there are also often marketing data that clearly point toward certain kinds of content and away from other kinds.[127] As one example of how these intersect to directly affect news and race, consider the findings of Av Westin.[128] As a former network news president, he interviewed a large sample of news decision-makers and found:

---

[122] cf. Hamilton 2004; Entman 1989.

[123] Hamilton 2004.

[124] Hamilton 2004: 239.

[125] Hamilton 2004: 240-41.

[126] Napoli 2002.

[127] Hamilton 2004.

[128] Westin 2001: 63.

[They] insisted again and again that race and ethnicity do have an effect on all components of a story. The interviews reveal a clear sense among the rank-and-file that news management's attitudes about race play a role in story selection and content, editorial point of view, and the skin color of the person who will provide the "expert" sound bite. At the network level, producers are "carefully taught" by the conventional wisdom of executive producers and their senior staffs that white viewers (whom advertisers regard as having greater purchasing power) will tune out if blacks or Latinos are the principal characters in segments on their shows.

Westin goes on to say that the conventional wisdom records the presumption of racially biased (white) audience tastes in this newsroom aphorism: "Blacks don't give good demos!"—meaning that available minute-by-minute Nielsen ratings of news shows reveal that significant numbers of demographically desirable white viewers switch stations when a story concerns African Americans.[129]   Similar reasoning may discourage use of persons of color as news sources, particularly *young* persons of color.[130]   This same sort of conventional wisdom about white tastes shapes the professional culture of television entertainment producers as well.[131]

There is sometimes considerable ambiguity, however, about what specific content will serve profitability while still fulfilling media workers' other needs, such as professional conduct, career advancement, and expression of one's creative instincts. Consider novelty as an example of an important explicit professional value that guides selection of material. Whether in the news, entertainment, or advertising, novelty is often valued—but only to a point. The material cannot be too novel or it threatens to be too unfamiliar and perhaps incomprehensible, uninteresting, or disturbing, both to media personnel and to audiences.   For instance, Lundman studied coverage of murder and discovered that it varies substantially—not every murder gets a big splash.[132] Lundman shows how racial and gender stereotypes (or what he calls "typifications") combine with the journalistic value of novelty to shape the selection of murder stories. Newspapers paid greater attention to homicides that were less novel if the murders conformed to race and gender expectations and fears. They devoted more space to black males murdering white males than to the opposite, even though both are rare (i.e., novel).

Meanwhile, common murders, such as white males killing white females, receive more attention than their lack of novelty would predict.

It is important to remember that media decision-makers, from the executive suites to the newsroom or editing room, operate like all humans with bounded rationality: bound by their *cognitive and emotional habits and limitations*. These include stereotypes and other forms of schematic, pre-coded thinking. Such habits are mandatory; they reduce the time, energy, and emotional costs of processing information and making decisions.[133]   Media workers apply their pre-existing cognitive schemas when choosing and writing their stories, planning their careers, seeking sources for quotes, or casting actors in parts for TV shows and commercials. All of this is typically done under substantial time pressure, which heightens reliance on mental shortcuts and unthinking emotional reactions. They also do their work in an environment rife with competition from others, who would like to steal their glamorous and sometimes lucrative media jobs. At the same time, they make their decisions under intense scrutiny from persons above them in the organizational hierarchy, right up to the CEO him/herself, who must report to a Board of Directors that is usually mainly concerned with the bottom line rather than social responsibility.[134]   All of these factors provide strong incentives to avoid rocking the boat or earning the label of "troublemaker" by challenging decisions that might result in subtle racial stereotyping. Few media workers want to be considered arbiters of "political correctness." Even if they are willing to take that risk, they might not have realistic solutions that are congruent with such professional newsroom values as neutrality and balance in the news, and such entertainment and advertising values as keeping mass audiences happy and in a buying mood. These factors all suggest reasons why, despite years of criticism for negative stereotyping, insufficient lead roles for persons of color in movies and TV, and so much more, the media continue to crank out material vulnerable to the same criticism.

The cognitive and emotional forces at work among media decision-makers include their own racial misunderstandings and their tendencies toward ambivalence or animosity. Even when they are not racist (and relatively few media personnel can get away with expressing outright racism in their productions, even if they are privately racist),[135]   automatic, stereotyped racial thinking of the kind discussed earlier inevitably shapes

---

[129] Westin 2001: 64.

[130] cf. Simon and Hayes 2004: 92.

[131] Entman and Rojecki 2000: chapter 9.

[132] Lundman 2003.

[133] See, for example, Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000; Fiske 1991; Kang 2005.

[134] Hamilton 2004.

[135] cf. Westin 2001.

choices.[136]   Entman and Rojecki discuss how choice of cover models for *Time* and *Newsweek* reflects both unconscious assumptions that the baseline, typical human being is white and hard data that show that putting persons of color on the covers usually reduces sales.[137]

The paucity of persons of color in positions of media owner-ship or decision-making power is a frequent explanation for the racial images documented here. Benson notes that, between 1978 and 2000, the U.S. population went from 19 percent to 30 percent persons of color, while they represented just 20 percent of television station employees by 2000.[138]   As of 2005, about 14 percent of newspaper employees were persons of color.[139]   Persons of color are most strikingly underrepresented in executive positions. Still, as Benson says, hiring more African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics is no panacea. Consider, for instance, the fact that Time Inc. now has an African American CEO and *Newsweek's* top editor is an African American. Nei-ther has much maneuvering room given market constraints, the values and cognitive habits and limitations of the staffs, and other forces acting on them (this is discussed further in the next section).

Finally, as already suggested, *social realities* also shape media content, particularly (but not only) news. For instance, consider the reality that there are comparatively high crime and arrest rates among young black males for certain types of crime. That fact combines with professional values that deem gang violence by blacks and Latinos to be more routinely newsworthy than fraudulent or discriminatory loan practices in banking, or mar-keting of lethal drugs by pharmaceutical companies. In part, this choice arises from white audiences' and journalists' racial, ethnic, and gender schemas or typifications for the concept of "crime." As noted earlier, crime news, in turn, reinforces aspects of white racial animosity. It is important to emphasize that reality does not compel any particular coverage; but it does help to propel it. Thus, the reality of street crime by YMC could be far better contextualized, and reports could be made more ethnically balanced and neutral.[140]   Certainly, "60 Min-utes" has shown that "white collar" crime, mostly committed by whites, can garner good ratings. Without a doubt, so-called "crime in the suites" perpetrated by corporate executives im-

poses enormous costs on most white viewers, who have little realistic possibility of falling victim to serious street violence.

To conclude with another example of the role of social reali-ties, this time in entertainment television, consider play-by-play coverage of basketball. The sheer fact that the games are extraordinarily fast-paced—interacting with professional values and market pressures—fosters racial biases in the narration. This happens despite sportscasters' awareness of racial stereo-types and attempts to avoid using them.[141]   Just as Kang and others would predict, the need for quick yet articulate reactions to the rapidly shifting action on the floor leads announcers to rely on unconscious, stereotyped assumptions.[142]   For example, a sportscaster trying to keep up with constantly changing condi-tions and new plays on the floor might automatically invoke such clichés as "Another amazing jump and dunk by this gifted athlete!" or "Another steal for Jordan as he takes advantage of his incredible natural speed!" Such remarks play into the stereo-type of black athletes as inherently more gifted, whereas credit for hard work and intelligent play tends to go to white athletes more often.

---

[136] See Kang 2005.

[137] Entman and Rojecki 2000.

[138] Benson 2005: 10.

[139] American Society of Newspaper Editors 2005.

[140] cf. Westin 2001.

[141] Bruce 2004.

[142] Kang 2005; Bruce 2004: 864.

AMELIORATING THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCES OF MEDIA

Solving policy problems is often more difficult than describing them, and this holds particularly true when the issues involve the media. The First Amendment limits options for handling negative effects of the news, especially when the content at issue is subtle (as opposed to pornography or even violence, for example). Potential options for ameliorating some of the negative influences described here include:

1. **Heightening awareness and vigilance through systematic monitoring**

2. **Promoting "best practices" in journalism and in other media products**

3. **Implementing legal or regulatory policies that can pass First Amendment scrutiny**

4. **Imposing social/political sanctions on coded appeals to prejudice against young men of color**

5. **Conducting well-designed inter-group dialogues and educational programs**

6. **Employing subsidies for digital media as outlets for positive images**

Promoting heightened awareness and vigilance through monitoring

Government- and foundation-sponsored monitoring and research on the racial content of media products is the first step toward greater understanding among members of the public and media leaders alike. Although the government and foundations have generously funded research on the nature, extent, and effects of media violence for many decades, research on and monitoring of the media's images of ethnicity have garnered far less support and publicity. The enormous costs to all Americans imposed by racial antagonism and ignorance, and the significant role of the media in cultivating sentiments that maintain these undesirable conditions, indicate that such a research and monitoring program would be highly valuable. At the very least, it would provide a baseline—and then over time data on changes for the better and for the worse—regarding images of persons of color. Similar to the annual reports on violence in television programs, which foundations and government entities have long sponsored, reports on media images affecting persons of color, including young men of color, would promote attention and awareness, and would allow citizens and policymakers to make policy judgments informed by empirical evidence.

Best journalism practices

The primary advantages of "best practices" are that they can be adopted without government action and that they may very well improve profits and productivity.[143]   A partial list of such practices, as published on the website of the Columbia Journalism School, includes the following questions:

- What is the demographic breakdown of my circulation area and state?

- Who on the staff has "listening posts" or sources in communities of color?

- Where are they [communities of color]? Do you know the grassroots leaders? Could your staff members identify the leaders from their pictures? Could you?

- What are the images being projected by the front pages? Who is in the photographs? Do the ratios of men to women, or people of color to whites, match our demographic profile?

- As I examine and explore my coverage area, how do I assess its importance in the lives of people in various groups throughout our area?

- Do I attempt to find out how the actions of the agency or organization I cover affect people in diverse populations in our community?

- Do I communicate with my editor about ways to broaden our focus so that the paper looks at this beat with an eye toward the variety of stories it could produce?

These ideas apply to news media, but analogous ethical responsibilities could apply to advertisers and entertainment (and "infotainment") producers as well. Below is a list of principles regarding the kind of work to which journalists should aspire, as advanced by the former editor of the *Milwaukee Sentinel*—principles that appear relevant across the media spectrum:

- Work that fights fear

---

[143] See Mazingo 2001; Westin 2001.

• Work that spotlights demographic destiny

• Work that taps into humanity[144]

Although media executives and other decision-makers down the line might resist any such practices that seem to threaten profits or creative autonomy, those recommending these practices can and should make the case that they might bolster—and are unlikely to significantly damage—the bottom line in an increasingly multicultural society.

Legal and regulatory action

Efforts to reduce the negative externalities (unintended consequences) and boost the positive externalities produced by media markets face barriers in the United States from currently dominant interpretations of the First Amendment.[145]   These emphasize a literal interpretation of the amendment as prohibiting virtually all forms of direct government intervention to shape content. There have been some counter-arguments, however. For example, Baynes proposes the use of the precedent of the FCC, in a few instances years ago, denying license renewals to television stations that overtly discriminated against blacks by refusing to air programs representing African Americans.[146]   Since the courts upheld these license denials, Baynes writes, there appears to be constitutional means of regulating systematically discriminatory racial content of current programming on television. Indeed, Baynes writes that the "FCC's failure to act against the broadcast networks and their possible complicity in the discrimination by advertisers may make the FCC a passive participant in the broadcast networks' discrimination."[147]   Bender's analysis of libel law, on the other hand, suggests that the imposition of more direct regulatory policies to combat media stereotyping, for example, is unlikely to succeed.[148]   In any case, all three branches of government over the past two decades have decisively tilted towards a deregulatory stance, especially when it comes to specifying content.

Policies to promote more diverse ownership and management appear more acceptable from a First Amendment vantage point, although they have recently fallen out of favor at the FCC.

Nonetheless, perspectives at that agency or in Congress could change, and there are certainly arguments in favor of promoting diversity and opposing concentration of media ownership in order to encourage the diffusion of social power and to make room for more ownership and managerial influence by persons of color.[149]

Solages reports that persons of color own just 4.2 percent of all radio stations and 1.5 percent of TV stations.[150]   Black ownership of TV and radio broadcast stations amounts to less than one percent of the total industry asset value. Meanwhile, the FCC has allowed a few large owners to enjoy an increasing share of stations; as these percentages suggest, the owners of the largest enterprises are white. The number of TV stations owned by blacks dropped from 32 to 20 in the three years after ownership restrictions were eased in 1999.[151]   Aside from ownership, one perspective on the limited voice given to persons of color is provided by the Directors Guild of America, which found that, in 2000-2001, on the 40 most popular TV series, African American males directed three percent of episodes, Latino males directed two percent, and Asian American males directed one percent. (Whereas 11 percent of episodes were directed by white women, two Asian American women constituted the total representation of females of color who directed episodes.)[152]

Benson argues that merely increasing the numbers of broadcast stations owned or managed by persons of color will not provide a solution if the market undervalues minority audiences, as indicated by evidence discussed earlier.[153]   Many advertisers appear unwilling to pay efficient prices for broadcasts that target non-white audiences because they cling to stereotypes (such as the bizarre assumption that "black people don't eat beef").[154] Many radio stations operate under "No minority/Spanish" dictates, meaning that clients direct their advertising agencies to not buy time on stations that target persons of color. A systematic undervaluing of persons of color in the advertising market not only undercuts production of programming oriented to these persons, but also means that the tastes of persons of color will carry less weight in programmers' decisions about general audience fare than if advertisers had better information.[155]

---

[144] Gissler 2001.

[145] See Goodman 2004 for a critique.

[146] Baynes 2003.

[147] Baynes 2003: 311.

[148] Bender 2003.

[149] See Baker 2002.

[150] Solages 2003.

[151] Solages 2003: 21.

[152] Baynes 2003: 312-13.

[153] Benson, 2005.

[154] See Ofori 1999.

[155] See also Goodman 2004: 1426-27.

Some evidence indicates that station owners who are persons of color exhibit more sensitivity to the programming interests of non-white audiences.[156]   Such owners would likely pursue advertising targeted at persons of color. In addition, the positive externalities of non-white ownership may be significant. In an intriguing study, Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel find that black voter turnout is higher in areas of higher black population, and their analysis indicates that one reason for this is that such areas are served by more black-oriented media content.[157]

As to employment of persons of color in high-level positions, Benson argues that the increase in minority employment in the newsroom has helped alter word usage; for instance, such phrases as "illegal alien" have generally been replaced by "undocumented immigrant."[158]   On the other hand, he asserts, recent decades, which have seen growing representation of persons of color in newsrooms, have also shown an ideological narrowing and de-politicization of journalism. He argues, in fact, that staff diversity becomes mostly a tool for marketing to ethnic audiences and for public relations image enhancement, rather than for affecting substantive news coverage.[159]   This might be predictable in light of the market pressures and other forces influencing media content, all of which narrow the discretion exercised by individual media workers and decision-makers—no matter what their ethnicity—regarding decisions about what to put on the screen or page. Nonetheless, it is difficult to discern what harm would result from promoting affirmative action in the media; indeed, many corporations have voluntarily adopted such policies in recognition of growing diversity in the population.

Two specific recommendations follow from this discussion:

> • **Federal communications and anti-trust policy should be used to enhance ethnic diversity in ownership and in top executive positions of the media.**

> • **Foundations should fund systematic education of decision-makers in the advertising industry, on both the client and agency sides, to reduce discrimination against media audiences perceived as less valuable than they actually are.**

One other important procedural public policy option that would have potentially substantive results would be for the FCC, the courts, and Congress to rely upon more thorough and innovative social scientific and legal research. A 2004 federal court decision, later upheld by the Supreme Court, required the FCC to reconsider its loosening of rules on media ownership after the Commission asserted it was following congressional mandates in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.[160]   In that instance and perhaps others, regulators and members of Congress appear to base policy more on assumptions or skewed evidence than on careful consideration of underlying complexities and social goals. In fact, Kang goes so far as to suggest that more careful analysis would undermine one of the primary goals of FCC policy.[161]   Although the FCC acts on the presumption that increasing the amount of local television news has positive effects (as documented by Kang's literature review and other studies discussed earlier), local TV news has negative externalities. Most importantly for our purposes, it appears to heighten whites' racial anxieties and hostilities, and that, in turn, has demonstrable effects on their political opinions and voting. It is conceivable that such negative externalities are outweighed by positive social benefits. The point here, however, is that neither the FCC nor the courts (nor Congress) treat communications policy decisions with the sensitivity and depth they merit. Hence, the following recommendation:

> **Because their choices can affect the lives of YMC and the entire society in surprising and important ways—effects only recently discovered by social scientists and even more recently incorporated into legal scholarship—officials should evaluate communications policy decisions more carefully, minimizing reliance upon unproven assumptions or incomplete evidence.[162]**

Sanction political candidates who use coded appeals to racial or ethnic animosity

To put a finer point on the earlier discussion, one source of negative media effects on YMC is politicians' use of indirect appeals to racial or ethnic antagonism through visual images or code words, such as "inner city," "crime," or "poverty." Sometimes the use may be well-intentioned or inadvertent,

---

[156] See Mason, Bachen, and Craft 2001; Owens 2004.

[157] Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 2005.

[158] Benson 2005.

[159] Benson 2005: 9-10.

[160] The case is *Prometheus Radio Project vs. Federal Communications Commission*, 3rd Circuit (issued 24 June 2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2004/03-3388-062404.pdf.

[161] Kang 2005.

[162] cf. Kang 2005; Goodman 2004.

but this excuse wears thin as research piles up demonstrating the racial decoding of these appeals.[163] Of course, politicians have First Amendment rights to make whatever appeals they choose. (Interestingly, however, politicians and citizens in many other democracies, which judge racist speech to be more socially damaging than beneficial, do *not* exercise such rights.)[164] Mendelberg's research most thoroughly supports the idea that labeling negative racial appeals for what they are tends to inoculate ambivalent or even antagonistic whites against responding favorably to those appeals. After all, most people do not want to view themselves as racists. Thus, the recommendation advanced here is to:

> **Hold candidates to account for using racially antagonistic appeals by publicly and prominently exposing them as such, and demanding that they cease.**

Conduct well-designed inter-group dialogues and educational interventions

Research on inter-ethnic dialogue provides surprises, along with some guidance. Mendelberg and Oleske demonstrate that merely setting up opportunities for exchanges on controversial issues between African Americans and whites does not advance mutual understanding *unless* the white participants have been educated in advance on the subtleties of racial stereotyping and discrimination.[165] Otherwise, these researchers found, whites (like many politicians) used a "coded rhetoric that appeared universal, but in fact advanced the group interest." Blacks decoded the rhetoric as self-serving and the groups wound up talking past each other, rather than building trust and consensus. The authors suggest, however, that more frequent interactions might allow for education to occur and distrust to diminish. Thus, they endorse:

> • **Conducting ongoing discussions, rather than one-time meetings**
>
> • **Selecting neutral discussion sites that de-emphasize the salience of group lines**
>
> • **Finding grounds for one compromise, which can build trust for further compromises**
>
> • **Promoting inter-group contact through residential desegregation**

On this last point, however, the evidence is mixed. As noted earlier, residential proximity to persons of color, along with media exposure, seems to heighten many whites' anxieties and punitive tendencies toward African Americans and Latinos. Frequent interactions among whites in their neighborhoods—which might be expected to promote feelings of security—does not counter the negative influence of the media. Instead, people who frequently talk to their neighbors may pass along inaccurate information from media impressions and rumors.[166] Like Mendelberg and Oleske, Matei, Ball-Rokeach, and Qui appreciate the importance of specific educational communication, in this case recommending:

> **Dissemination of specific targeted messages encouraging people to visit areas they (often unreasonably) fear.**

Interventions in schools that are designed to reduce racial misunderstanding have been extensively studied. Graves showed that videos intended to reduce prejudice do improve attitudes among both black and white children to some extent, whether the videos are viewed at home or at school.[167] Videos are most effective, writes Graves, when they:

> • **Are used in conjunction with specific racial conflicts**
> • **Include models of effective solutions**
> • **Are developmentally appropriate**

On this latter point, research by Persson and Musker-Eizenmann found that showing three- to six-year-old children a video *four times* had no impact on their pro-white biases (which were, of course, uncovered by unobtrusive measures, not sociological questionnaires).[168] They also found that these kids were somewhat more prejudiced against blacks than against Latinos or Asians. The crucial point for the purposes of this report, however, is again that educational efforts have to be appropriately specific and targeted to their audiences.

This is no easy task. Holtzman illustrates the complexities of inducing even college students—who are both old enough to understand concepts like stereotyping and fairness, and young enough, one would hope, to change their views—to communicate honestly and remain open to other groups' views.[169] Indeed, anyone who has taught a college course on race can attest to the sensitivity of these matters. Even the

---

[163] Gilens 1999; Mendelberg 2001; and Hurwitz and Peffley 2005.

[164] See Frydman and Rorive 2002.

[165] Mendelberg and Oleske 2000.

[166] Matei, Ball-Rokeach, and Qui 2001.

[167] Graves 1999.

[168] Persson and Musker-Eizenmann 2003.

[169] Holtzman 2004: 115.

white students in these courses, who constitute a group more amenable to interracial dialogue than average (or they would not sign up for such a class), become defensive when confronted with information on white privilege and other concepts rarely acknowledged in the dominant culture. The implication is that conducting productive educational programs and inter-group dialogues outside the college setting is even more complicated and sensitive.

Nonetheless, such efforts should be promoted. Social psychologists have begun to provide insights into mechanisms that might counter the largely automatic processes by which racial (or other) stereotypes influence perception, emotion, and behavior.[170] Applying these ideas in organized efforts to change negative thoughts and feelings about YMC, who are especially subject to the negativity, can help in altering the self-perpetuating cycle illustrated in Figure 1. Careful educational interventions can assist in moving market demand for media products in more positive, stereotype-defeating directions; rendering whites (and others) less susceptible to coded appeals to ethnic prejudice; and improving treatment of YMC and other persons of color by white sales clerks, police officers, teachers, doctors, employers, and others in interpersonal or institutional settings.

Subsidize digital media as new outlets for positive expression

For Goodman, the era of digital media significantly improves the opportunities for positive government regulation in the form of subsidies, which do not interfere with media owners' First Amendment rights.[171] Although she is not primarily concerned with media images of YMC or with race relations, Goodman's general prescription clearly applies to the scarcity of opportunities for exposure to positive media images of YMC— a scarcity that affects whites as well as persons of color. In the context of this report, the key point, as Goodman puts it, is altering consumer desires: "Subsidies for a robust public service media, as opposed to media regulations, are the most promising and constitutionally acceptable way to increase consumption of programming that exposes viewers to difference, forges community, and elevates discourse in the face of content abundance and attention scarcity."[172] This, in turn, "might then force the market to provide media products with greater positive externalities, including common exposure to difference and public elevation."[173] She recommends:

A subsidy in the form of a grant for multi-media content concerning minority populations, [including] a compelling outreach program using such techniques as search engines, community screenings and events, school curricula, blogs, and marketing to increase exposure.

She argues that the subsidies would be constitutional "so long as a preference for 'minority programming' was not a cover for invidious viewpoint discrimination."[174]

---

[170] Dasgupta and Greenwald 2001; cf. Bargh 1999.

[171] Goodman 2004: 1393.

[172] Goodman 2004: 1472.

[173] Goodman 2004: 1419.

[174] Goodman 2004: 1464; cf. on the Internet and persons of color, Bargh and McKenna 2004.

CONCLUSION

One consequence (and cause) of the media patterns and effects explored here is that whites and persons of color occupy distinctly different cultural spaces. Brown and Pardun found, for example, that even among younger persons—often presumed to share a common "youth culture"—use of media varies dramatically by race.[175] Among nearly 3,000 middle school children in their sample, only four of 140 TV shows were watched by at least one-third of the four measured audience segments (white males and females, and black males and females). Around 70 percent of black teenagers watch the 10 highest-rated shows among blacks (all with mainly black casts); none of these shows was watched by more than 16 percent of white teens. White teens also mostly watched shows featuring casts predominantly of their own race, although they watched less TV overall. Viewing differences among black and white adults are almost as great, and the movie and advertising businesses also feature a degree of racial segmentation, if not segregation.[176]

The implication of racially distinct media choices appears to be heightened interracial alienation—a reinforced sense of difference and sensitivity to difference. The black-oriented TV shows and films, as well as music videos, are often criticized by African Americans as supporting negative stereotypes (Spike Lee's satirical film about TV and race, *Bamboozled*, offers vivid examples). Others, however, would argue that blacks and whites view the shows with an ironic eye. We cannot settle that dispute here, and there are no equivalent media outlets specializing in Latino or Asian productions.[177] Still, it does seem reasonable to hypothesize that much of the irony is lost on the white majority, who are ambivalent or antagonistic (or racist) toward persons of color, and are likely to be especially ignorant about and threatened by young men of color.

The obvious solution may be to get everyone to start watching the same TV programs, movies, and news shows, and for these media to feature diverse, realistic, multi-dimensional content. And so we return to the vicious circles: very little supply of such media content, which fosters continued racial and ethnic misunderstanding, which, in turn, encourages those running the

dominant media to produce innocuous and often stereotyped images compatible with the status quo. As we have seen, however, the status quo imposes demonstrable harm on persons of color and, in particular, on young men of color.

---

[175] Brown and Pardun 2002.

[176] Entman and Rojecki 2000.

[177] More precisely, although there is a well-developed, parallel Hispanic media culture, it is generally inaccessible to whites because of the language barrier. In addition, not all Latinos speak Spanish, and acculturation may reduce demand for separate ethnic media. The less extensive, fragmented Asian media market experiences even greater linguistic and other barriers to growth beyond small niches.

REFERENCES CONSULTED AND CITED

Amana, Harry. 1995. Million Man March's Success: Media Misses the Real Story, Focuses on Controversy. *Black Issues in Higher Education* 12 (18):40.

American Society of Newspaper Editors. Newstaffs shrinking while minority presence grows. 12 April 2005. Accessed 9 June 2005 at: http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=5648.

Anastasio, P. A., K. C. Rose, and J. G. Chapman. 2005. The divisive coverage effect—How media may cleave differences of opinion between social groups. *Communication Research* 32 (2):171-192.

Appiah, K. Anthony, and Amy Gutmann. 1996. *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Appiah, O. 2004. Effects of ethnic identification on Web browsers' attitudes toward and navigational patterns on race-targeted sites. *Communication Research* 31 (3):312-337.

Baker, C. Edwin. 2002. Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy. 54 *Florida Law Review* (December):839.

Banks, T. L. 2003. Exploring white resistance to racial reconciliation in the United States. *Rutgers Law Review* 55 (4):903-964.

Bargh, J. A., M. Chen, and L. Burrows. 1996. Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71:230-44.

Bargh, J. A. 1999. The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in *Dual Process Theories in Social Psychology*, eds. S. Chaiken and Y. Trope, 361-82. New York: Guilford.

Bargh, John A., and K. Y. McKenna. 2004. The Internet and Social Life. *Annual Review of Psychology* 55:573-90.

Barker, V., and H. Giles. 2002. Who supports the English-only movement: Evidence for misconceptions about Latino group vitality. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 23 (5):353-370.

Barongan, C., and G. C. N. Hall. 1995. The influence of misogynous rap music on sexual aggression against women. *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 19:195-207.

Baumer, E. P., S. F. Messner, and R. Rosenfeld. 2003. Explaining Spatial Variation in Support for Capital Punishment: A Multi-level Analysis. *American Journal of Sociology* 108:844-75.

Baynes, L. M. 2000. Paradoxes of racial stereotypes, diversity and past discrimination in establishing affirmative action in FCC broadcast licensing. *Administrative Law Review* 52 (3):979-997.

Baynes, L. M. 2003. White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming. *Arizona Law Review* 45:293.

Bender, Steven W. 2003. *Greasers and Gringos: Latinos, Law, and the American Imagination*. New York: New York University Press.

Benson, R. 2005. American Journalism and the politics of diversity. *Media Culture & Society* 27 (1):5-20.

Bertrand, Marianne, and Mullainathan, Sendhil. 2004. Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination. *The American Economic Review* 94: 991.

Bogle, D. 2003. *Toms, Coons, Mulattoes and Bucks*. 4th ed. New York: Continuum International Publishing.

Brown, J. D., and C. J. Pardun. 2004. Little in common: Racial and gender differences in adolescents' television diets. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 48 (2):266-278.

Browne K. D., and C. Hamilton-Giachritsis. 2005. The influence of violent media on children and adolescents: a public-health approach. *Lancet* 365:702-710.

Bruce, T. 2004. Marking the boundaries of the 'normal' in televised sports: the play-by-play of race. *Media Culture & Society* 26 (6):861-79.

Buffington, D. 2005. Contesting race on Sundays: Making meaning out of the rise in the number of black quarterbacks. *Sociology of Sport Journal* 22 (1):19-37.

Busselle, R., and H. Crandall. 2002. Television viewing and perceptions about race differences in socioeconomic success. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 46 (2):265-282.

Carmines, E. G., and G. C. Layman. 1998. When Prejudice Matters: The Impact of Racial Stereotypes on the Racial Policy Preferences of Democrats and Republicans. In *Perception and Prejudice: Race and Politics in the United States*, eds. J. Hurwitz and M. Peffley. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Chen, Xinguang, Tess Boley Cruz, Darleen V. Schuster, Jennifer B. Unger, and Carl Anderson Johnson. 2002. Receptivity to Pro-tobacco Media and Its Impact on Cigarette Smoking Among Ethnic Minority Youth in California. *Journal of Health Communication* 7(3):245-8.

Chermak, S. 1998. Predicting crime story salience: The effects of crime, victim, and defendant characteristics. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 26 (1):61-70.

ChildrenNow. 2001. Fair Play: Violence, Gender and Race in Video Games. Oakland, CA: Children Now.

ChildrenNow. 2004. Fall colors: 2003-04 prime time diversity report. Oakland, CA: Children Now.

Chiricos, T., and S. Eschholz. 2002. The racial and ethnic typification of crime and the criminal typification of race and ethnicity in local television news. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 39 (4):400-420.

Chiricos, T., R. McEntire, and M. Gertz. 2001. Perceived racial and ethnic composition of neighborhood and perceived risk of crime. *Social Problems* 48 (3):322-340.

Chiricos, T., K. Welch, and M. Gertz. 2004. Racial typification of crime and support for punitive measures. *Criminology* 42 (2):359-389.

Clawson, R. A. 2002. Poor people, Black faces—The portrayal of poverty in economics textbooks. *Journal of Black Studies* 32 (3):352-361.

Clawson, R. A., and R. Trice. 2000. Poverty as we know it—Media portrayals of the poor. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 64 (1):53-64.

Clawson, R. A., and E. N. Waltenburg. 2003. Support for a Supreme Court affirmative action decision—A story in black and white. *American Politics Research* 31 (3):251-279.

Coleman, R. 2003. Race and ethical reasoning: The importance of race to journalistic decision making. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 80 (2):295-310.

Condit, C. M., R. L. Parrott, T. M. Harris, J. Lynch, and T. Dubriwny. 2004. The role of "genetics" in popular understandings of race in the United States. *Public Understanding of Science* 13 (3):249-272.

Coover, G. E. 2001. Television and social identity: Race representation as "White" accommodation. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 45 (3):413-431.

Coover, G. E., and L. C. Godbold. 1998. Convergence between racial and political identities—Boundary erasure or aversive racism? *Communication Research* 25 (6):669-688.

Correll, J., B. Park, C. M. Judd, and B. Wittenbrink. 2002. The police officer's dilemma: Using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83:1314.

Cose, E. 1993. *The Rage of a Privileged Class*. New York: HarperCollins.

Craft, Stephanie. 2003. Translating Ownership into Action. *Howard Journal of Communications* 14:147-58.

Cunningham, William A., Marcia K. Johnson, Carol L. Raye, J. Chris Gatenby, John C. Gore, and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2004. Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces. *Psychological Science* 15 (12):806-813.

D'Alessio, S. J., and L. Stolzenberg. 2003. Race and the probability of arrest. *Social Forces* 81 (4):1381-1397.

Dasgupta, D., and A. G. Greenwald. 2001. On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81:800-07.

Denham, B. E., A. C. Billings, and K. K. Halone. 2002. Differential accounts of race in broadcast commentary of the 2000 NCAA men's and women's final four basketball tournaments. *Sociology of Sport Journal* 19 (3):315-332.

Dixon, T. L., C. L. Azocar, and M. Casas. 2003. The portrayal of race and crime on television network news. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 47 (4):498-523.

Dixon, T. L., and D. Linz. 2000. Race and the misrepresentation of victimization on local television news. *Communication Research* 27 (5):547-573.

Dixon, T. L., and D. Linz. 2000. Overrepresentation and underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos as lawbreakers on television news. *Journal of Communication* 50 (2):131-154.

Dixon, T. L., and D. Linz. 2002. Television news, prejudicial pretrial publicity, and the depiction of race. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 46 (1):112-136.

Domke, D. 2001. Racial cues and political ideology—An examination of associative priming. *Communication Research* 28 (6):772-801.

Domke, D., P. Garland, A. Billeaudeaux, and J. Hutcheson. 2003. Insights into US racial hierarchy: Racial profiling, news sources, and September 11. *Journal of Communication* 53 (4):606-623.

Domke, D., K. McCoy, and M. Torres. 1999. News media, racial perceptions, and political cognition. *Communication Research* 26 (5):570-607.

Dorfman, L., and K. Woodruff. 1998. The roles of speakers in local television news stories on youth and violence. *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 26 (2):80-85.

Dorfman, L., K. Woodruff, V. Chavez, and L. Wallack. 1997. Youth and violence on local television news in California. *American Journal of Public Health* 87 (8):1311-1316.

Dovidio, John F., and Samuel L. Gaertner, eds. 1986. *Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism: Theory and Research*. New York: Academic Press.

Dowler, K. 2004. Comparing American and Canadian local television crime stories: A content analysis. *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice* 46 (5):573-596.

Dreier, Peter. 2005. How the Media Compound Urban Problems. In *Journal of Urban Affairs*: Blackwell Publishing Limited.

Dyson, Michael Eric. 1996. *Between God and Gangsta Rap: Bearing Witness to Black Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Edsall, T. B., and M. D. Edsall. 1991. *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Norton.

Elena Cepeda, María. Mucho loco for Ricky Martin; or The Politics of Chronology, Crossover, and Language within the Latin(o) Music 'Boom.' *Popular Music and Society* 24 (3):55-71.

Entman, R. M., and A. Rojecki. 2000. *The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Entman, R. M. 1995 Television, Democratic Theory and the Visual Construction of Poverty. *Research in Political Sociology* 7:39–59.

Entman, R. M. 1989. Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Eschholz, S., B. S. Blackwell, M. Gertz, and T. Chiricos. 2002. Race and attitudes toward the police—Assessing the effects of watching "reality" police programs. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 30 (4):327-341.

Eschholz, Sarah, Ted Chiricos, and Marc Gertz. 2003. Television and Fear of Crime: Program Types, Audience Traits, and the Mediating Effects of Perceived Neighborhood Racial Composition. In *Social Problems*: University of California Press.

Eschholz S., J. Bufkin, and J. Long. 2002. Symbolic reality bites: Women and racial/ethnic minorities in modern film. *Sociological Spectrum* 22: 299-334.

Feagin, J. R., and H. Vera. 1995. *White Racism: The Basics*. New York: Routledge.

Feld, B. C. 2003. The politics of race and juvenile justice: The "due process revolution" and the conservative reaction. *Justice Quarterly* 20 (4):765-800.

Fishman, J. M., and C. Marvin. 2003. Portrayals of violence and group difference in newspaper photographs: Nationalism and media. *Journal of Communication* 53 (1):32-44.

Fiske, Susan T., and Shelley E. Taylor. 1991. *Social Cognition*. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.

Fiske, Susan T. 1998. Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination. In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, eds. D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey. 4th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Fogel, Matthew. 2005. "Grey's Anatomy" Goes Colorblind. *New York Times*, May 8: Sec. 2, p. 16.

Fox, Cybelle. 2004. The Changing Color of Welfare? How Whites' Attitudes toward Latinos Influence Support for Welfare. *The American Journal of Sociology* 110 (3):580.

Frydman, B., and I. Rorive. 2002. Regulating Internet Content Through Intermediaries in the U.S. and Europe. *Zeitschrift fur Rechtssoziologie* 23:41-59.

Funk, Jeanne B., Heidi Bechtoldt Baldacci, Tracie Pasold, and Jennifer Baumgardner. 2004. Violence exposure in real-life, video games, television, movies, and the internet: is there desensitization? *Journal of Adolescence* 27 (1):23-39.

Gallagher, C. A. 2003. Miscounting race: Explaining whites' misperceptions of racial group size. *Sociological Perspectives* 46 (3):381-396.

Gandy, O. H., and J. Baron. 1998. Inequality—It's all in the way you look at it. *Communication Research* 25 (5):505-527.

Gandy, O. H., K. Kopp, T. Hands, K. Frazer, and D. Phillips. 1997. Race and risk—Factors affecting the framing of stories about inequality, discrimination, and just plain bad luck. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61 (1):158-182.

Garza, Oscar. 2001. It's not easy escaping ethnic labels and expectations. *Nieman Reports* 55 (2):15.

Gentile, Douglas A., Paul J. Lynch, Jennifer Ruh Linder, and David A. Walsh. 2004. The effects of violent video game habits on adolescent hostility, aggressive behaviors, and school performance. *Journal of Adolescence* 27 (1):5-22.

Gilens, M. 1996. "Race coding" and white opposition to welfare. *American Political Science Review* 90 (3):593-604.

Gilens, M. 1999. *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gilliam, F. D., N. A. Valentino, and M. N. Beckmann. 2002. Where you live and what you watch: The impact of racial proximity and local television news on attitudes about race and crime. *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (4):755-780.

Gilliam Jr., Franklin D., and Shanto Iyengar. 2000. Prime suspects: The influence of local television news on the viewing public. *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 560-73.

Gissler, Sig. 2001. "Let's Do It Better Workshop." Summarized by the Columbia Journalism School, accessed 9 June 2005 at: http://www.jrn.columbia.edu/events/race/growingyourcontent_gissler.html.

Goodman, Ellen. 2004. Media policy out of the box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets. *Berkeley Telphony Law Journal* 19:1389.

Goren, P. 2003. Race, sophistication, and white opinion on government spending. *Political Behavior* 25 (3):201-220.

Goshorn, K., and O. H. Gandy. 1995. Race, Risk and Responsibility—Editorial Constraint in the Framing of Inequality. *Journal of Communication* 45 (2):133-151.

Graves, S. B. 1999. Television and prejudice reduction: When does television as a vicarious experience make a difference? *Journal of Social Issues* 55 (4):707-727.

Greenwald, A. G., M. A. Oakes, and H. G. Hoffman. 2003. Targets of discrimination: Effects of race on responses to weapons holders. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 39 (4):399-405.

Gross, K., and S. Aday. 2003. The scary world in your living room and neighborhood: Using local broadcast news, neighborhood crime rates, and personal experience to test agenda setting and cultivation. *Journal of Communication* 53 (3):411-426.

Guerrero, Ed. 1994. The Black Image in Protective Custody. In *Black American Cinema*, edited by Diawara: Routledge.

Hamamoto, D. Y. 1994. *Monitored peril: Asian Americans and the Politics of TV Representation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hamilton, James. 2004. *All the news that's fit to sell: How the market transforms information into news*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hammond IV, Allen S. 1999. Measuring the nexus: The relationship between minority ownership and broadcast diversity after Metro Broadcasting. *Federal Communications Law Journal* 51 (3):627-636.

Henderson, Genevieve, and Gerald Baldasty. 2003. Race, Advertising and Prime Time Television. *Howard Journal of Communications* 14:97-112.

Hochschild, J. L. 1995. *Facing Up to the American Dream*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Holtzman, L. 2004. Mining the invisible—Teaching and learning media and diversity. *American Behavioral Scientist* 48 (1):108-118.

Hurwitz J., and M. Peffley. 2005. Playing the race card in the post-Willie Horton era—The impact of racialized code words on support for punitive crime policy. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69:99-112.

Hurwitz, J., and M. Peffley. 1997. Public perceptions of race and crime: The role of racial stereotypes. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (2):375-401.

Hutchings, V. L., and N. A. Valentino. 2004. The centrality of race in American politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:383-408.

Hutchings, V. L., N. A. Valentino, T. S. Philpot, and I. K. White. 2004. The compassion strategy—Race and the gender gap in campaign 2000. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 68 (4):512-541.

Iyengar, S. 1991. *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jackson, S. J. 2004. Exorcizing the ghost: Donovan Bailey, Ben Johnson and the politics of Canadian identity. *Media Culture & Society* 26 (1):121-41.

Jamieson, K. H. 1992. *Dirty Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jeffries, J. L. 2002. Press coverage of Black statewide candidates—The case of L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia. *Journal of Black Studies* 32 (6):673-697.

Johnson, F. L. 2002. The context of race in reading narratives on daytime talk shows. *Narrative Inquiry* 12 (2):431-438.

Johnson, J. D., S. Trawalter, and J. F. Dovidio. 2000. Converging interracial consequences of exposure to violent rap music on stereotypical attributions of blacks. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 36 (3):233-251.

Johnson, Melissa A. 2000. How Ethnic Are U.S. Ethnic Media: The Case of Latina Magazines. *Mass Communication and Society* 3 (2/3):229-48.

Jones, Jacqui. 1994. The Construction of Black Sexuality. In *Black American Cinema*, edited by Diawara: Routledge.

Juffer, Jane. 2002. Who's the Man? Sammy Sosa, Latinos, and Televisual Redefinitions of the 'American' Pastime. *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* 26:337-59.

Kang, J. 2000. Cyber-race. *Harvard Law Review* 113 (5):1130-1208.

Kang, J. 2005. Trojan horses of race. *Harvard Law Review* 118 (5):1489-1593.

Karst, K. L. 2003. Law, cultural conflict, and the socialization of children. *California Law Review* 91 (4):967-1028.

Kempley, Rita. 2003. Too Too Divine: Magic Negro Saves the Day, but at the Cost of His Soul. *Washington Post*, June 7.

Kinder, D., and L. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinnick, Katherine, Candace White, and Kadesha Washington. 2001. Racial Representation of Computer Users in Prime-Time Advertising. *Race, Gender & Class* 8 (4):96.

Kronenberger, William G., Vincent P. Mathews, David W. Dunn, Wang Yang, Elisabeth A. Wood, Ann L. Giauque, Joelle J. Larsen, Mary E. Rembusch, Mark J. Lowe, and Li Tie-Qiang. 2005. Media violence exposure and executive functioning in aggressive and control adolescents. *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 61 (6):725-37.

Kwak, Audrey. 2004. Asian Americans In The Television Media: Creating Incentive For Change. *Boston College Third World Law Journal* 395 24 (Spring):395.

Leonard, D. J. 2004. The next M. J. or the next O. J.? Kobe Bryant, race, and the absurdity of colorblind rhetoric. *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* 28 (3):284-313.

Leonardi, Paul M. 2003. Problematizing "New Media": Culturally Based Perceptions of Cell Phones, Computers, and the Internet among United States Latinos. *Critical Studies In Media Communication* 20 (2):160-179.

Levenstein, S., M. W. Smith, and G. A. Kaplan. 2001. Psychosocial Predictors of Hypertension in Men and Women. *Archives of Internal Medicine* 161:1341-46.

Levin, Diane E., and Nancy Carlsson-Paige. 2003. Marketing Violence: The Special Toll on Young Children of Color. *Journal of Negro Education* 72:427-37.

Lin, Elbert. 2002. "Yellow is Yellow." *Yale Law & Policy Review* 20:529-543.

Locke, Brian. 1998. Here Comes the Judge: The Dancing Itos and the Televisual Construction of the Enemy Asian Male. In *Living Color: Race and Television in the United States*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Lule, J. 1995. The Rape of Mike Tyson—Race, the Press and Symbolic Types. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 12 (2):176-195.

Lundman, R. J. 2003. The newsworthiness and selection bias in news about murder: Comparative and relative effects of novelty and race and gender typifications on newspaper coverage of homicide. *Sociological Forum* 18 (3):357-386.

Lundman, R. J., O. M. Douglass, and J. M. Hanson. 2004. News about murder in an African American newspaper: Effects of relative frequency and race and gender typifications. *Sociological Quarterly* 45 (2):249-272.

Macrae C.N., and G.V. Bodenhausen. 2000. Social cognition: Thinking categorically about others. *Annual Review of Psychology* 51:93-120.

Mason, Laurie, Christine M. Bachen, and Stephanie L. Craft. 2001. Support For FCC Minority Ownership Policy: How Broadcast Station Owner Race Or Ethnicity Affects News And Public Affairs Programming Diversity. *Communication Law & Policy* 6:37-73.

Mastro, Dana E., and Charles Atkin. 2002. Exposure to Alcohol Billboards and Beliefs and Attitudes toward Drinking among Mexican American High School Students. *Howard Journal of Communications* 13 (2):129-151.

Mastro, D. E., and A. L. Robinson. 2000. Cops and crooks—Images of minorities on primetime television. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 28 (5):385-396.

Matei, S., S. J. Ball-Rokeach, and J. L. Qiu. 2001. Fear and misperception of Los Angeles urban space—A spatial-statistical study of communication-shaped mental maps. *Communication Research* 28 (4):429-463.

Mayer, Vicki. 2004. Fractured Categories: New Writings on Latinos and Stereotypes—A Review Essay. *Latino Studies* 2 (3):445.

Mazingo, Sherrie. 2001. The Diversity Checklist: A self-editing Process to Evaluate Coverage. Accessed 9 June 2005 at: http://www.jrn.columbia.edu/events/race/growingyourcontent_diversity.html.

McKown, Clark, and Rhona S. Weinstein. 2003. The Development and Consequences of Stereotype Consciousness in Middle Childhood. In Child Development: Blackwell Publishing Limited.

Mendelberg, T., and J. Oleske. 2000. Race and public deliberation. *Political Communication* 17 (2):169-191.

Mendelberg, T. 2001. *The Race Card*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Meyers, M. 2004. African American women and violence: Gender, race, and class in the news. *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 21 (2):95-118.

Moscaro, Thomas. 2004. Homicide Life in the Streets: Progress in Portrayals of African American Men. *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 32 (1):10-19.

Myers, D. J., and B. S. Caniglia. 2004. All the rioting that's fit to print: Selection effects in national newspaper coverage of civil disorders, 1968-1969. *American Sociological Review* 69 (4):519-543.

Myers, G., T. Klak, and T. Koehl. 1996. The inscription of difference: News coverage of the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia. *Political Geography* 15 (1):21-46.

Nadeau, R., and R. G. Niemi. 1 993. Innumeracy about Minority Populations. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57:32–349.

Napoli, P. 2002. Audience valuation and audience media: An analysis of the determinants of the value of radio audiences. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 46(2):169-184.

National Urban League. *The State of Black America: Prescriptions for Change*. April 6, 2005. Available at ttp://www.nul.org/stateofblackamerica.html.

Niven, D. 2002. Bolstering an Illusory majority. *Social Science Quarterly* 83 (3):671-689.

Niven, D. 2004. A fair test of media bias: Party, race, and gender in coverage of the 1992 house banking scandal. *Polity* 36 (4):637-649.

Oates, T. P., and M. G. Durham. 2004. The mismeasure of masculinity: the male body, 'race' and power in the enumerative discourses of the NFL Draft. *Patterns of Prejudice* 38 (3):301-320.

Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Joel Waldfogel. 2005. Strength in Numbers: Group Size and Political Mobilization. *The Journal of Law & Economics* 48:73-91.

Ofori, Kofi Asiedu. 1999. When Being Number 1 is Not Enough: The Impact of Advertising Practices On Minority-Owned & Minority-Formatted Broadcast Stations. Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy. Accessed 21 November 2005 at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Informal/ad-study/.

Oliver, M. B. 1999. Caucasian viewers' memory of black and white criminal suspects in the news. *Journal of Communication* 49 (3):46-60.

Oliver, M. B., and D. Fonash. 2002. Race and crime in the news: Whites' identification and misidentification of violent and nonviolent criminal suspects. *Media Psychology* 4 (2):137-156.

Owens, W. LaNelle. 2004. Inequities on the air: The FCC media ownership rules—encouraging economic efficiency and disregarding the needs of minorities. *Howard Law Journal* 47:1037.

Paek, Hye Jin, and Hemant Shah. 2003. Racial Ideology, Model Minorities, and the "Not-So-Silent Partner": Stereotyping of Asian Americans in U.S. Magazine Advertising. *Howard Journal of Communications* 14 (4):225-243.

Pan, Z. D., and G. M. Kosicki. 1996. Assessing news media influences on the formation of whites' racial policy preferences. *Communication Research* 23 (2):147-178.

Parisi, P. 1998. The New York Times looks at one block in Harlem: Narratives of race in journalism. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 15 (3):236-254.

Payne, B. Keith. 2001. Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81:181-92.

Payne B. K., A. J. Lambert, and L. L. Jacoby. 2002. Best laid plans: Effects of goals on accessibility bias and cognitive control in race-based misperceptions of weapons. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 38 (4):384-396.

Peffley, M., J. Hurwitz, and P. M. Sniderman. 1997. Racial stereotypes and whites' political views of blacks in the context of welfare and crime. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1):30-60.

Peffley, M., T. Shields, and B. Williams. 1996. The intersection of race and crime in television news stories: An experimental study. *Political Communication* 13 (3):309-327.

Persson, A., and D. R. Musher-Eizenman. 2003. The impact of a prejudice-prevention television program on young children's ideas about race. *Early Childhood Research Quarterly* 18 (4):530-546.

Poindexter, P. M., L. Smith, and D. Heider. 2003. Race and ethnicity in local television news: Framing, story assignments, and source selections. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 47 (4):524-536.

Pride, R. A. 1999. Redefining the problem of racial inequality. *Political Communication* 16 (2):147-167.

Purugganan, Oscar H., Ruth E. K. Stein, Ellen Johnson Silver, and Blanche S. Benenson. 2003. Exposure to Violence Among Urban School-Aged Children: Is It Only on Television? *Journal of Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics* 24 (6):424-430.

Rada, J. A. 2000. A new piece to the puzzle: Examining effects of television portrayals of African Americans. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 44 (4):704-715.

Rainville, Raymond E., and Edward McCormick. 1977. Extent of Covert Racial Prejudice in Pro Football Announcers' Speech. *Journalism Quarterly* 54:10–26.

Reeves, Keith. 1997. *Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates & Racial Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rice, Glen. 1996. How the media covered the Million Man March. *NABJ Journal* 13 (5):1.

Rice, R. E., and J. E. Katz. 2003. Comparing internet and mobile phone usage: digital divides of usage, adoption, and dropouts. *Telecommunications Policy* 27 (8-9):597-623.

Richardson, J. D., and K. M. Lancendorfer. 2004. Framing affirmative action—The influence of race on newspaper editorial responses to the University of Michigan cases. *Harvard International Journal of Press-Politics* 9 (4):74-94.

Rimer, Sara, and Karen W. Arenson. 2004. Top Colleges Take More Blacks, but Which Ones? *New York Times*, June 24.

Ríos, Diana, and A. N. Mohamed. 2003. *Brown and Black Communication: Latino and African American Conflict and Convergence in Mass Media*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Rivero, Y. M. 2002. Erasing blackness: the media construction of 'race' in Mi Familia, the first Puerto Rican situation comedy with a black family. *Media Culture & Society* 24 (4):481-97.

Romer, D., K. H. Jamieson, and N. J. de Coteau. 1998. The treatment of persons of color in local television news—Ethnic blame discourse or realistic group conflict? *Communication Research* 25 (3):286-305.

Rosenthal, Robert. 1995. Critiquing Pygmalion: A 25-year perspective. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 4 (6):171-72 .

Rothbart, M., and O. P. John. 1993. Intergroup Relations and Stereotype Change. In *Prejudice, Politics, and the American Dilemma*, eds. P. M. Sniderman, P. E. Tetlock, and E. G. Carmines. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Sampson, Edward E. 1998. *Dealing with differences: An introduction to the social psychology of prejudice*. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Schaffner, Brian F., and Mark Gadson. 2004. Reinforcing Stereotypes? Race and Local Television News Coverage of Congress. *Social Science Quarterly* 85 (3):604-623.

Scharrer, Erica. 2002. Third-person perception and television violence—The role of out-group stereotyping in perceptions of susceptibility to effects. *Communication Research* 29 (6):681-704.

Scharrer, Erica. 2004. Virtual Violence: Gender and Aggression in Video Game Advertisements. *Mass Communication & Society* 7:393-412.

Schmader, Toni, and Michael Johns. 2003. Converging Evidence That Stereotype Threat Reduces Working Memory Capacity. In *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*: American Psychological Association.

Schuman, H., C. Steeh, L. Bobo, and M. Krysan. 1998. *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Shepard, B. 2003. Race, media and the crisis of civil society: From Watts to Rodney King. *Urban Affairs Review* 38 (6):867-869.

Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. 1994. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. London: Routledge.

Simon, J. and S. Hayes. 2004. Juvenile Crime Stories Use Police Blotter Without Comment from Suspects. *Newspaper Research Journal* 25: 89-94.

Sizemore, D. S., and W. T. Milner. 2004. Hispanic media use and perceptions of discrimination: Reconsidering ethnicity, politics, and socioeconomics. *Sociological Quarterly* 45 (4):765-784.

Slater, Michael D., Kimberly L. Henry, Randall C. Swaim, and Lori L. Anderson. 2003. Violent Media Content and Aggressiveness in Adolescents: A Downward Spiral Model. *Communication Research* 30 (6):713-736.

Smedley, Brian D., Adrienne Y. Smith, and Alan R. Nelson, eds. 2003. *Unequal treatment: Confronting racial and ethnic disparities in health care*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Solages, Carrie. 2003. If the FCC Rule Changes Survive, Minority Broadcasting May Not. *Crisis (The New)*: Crisis Publications Inc.

Soss, J., L. Longbein, and A. R. Metelko. 2003. Why do white Americans support the death penalty. *Journal of Politics* 65:397-421.

Steele, Claude. 1997. A Threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. *American Psychologist* 52:613-29.

Subervi, Federico. 2004. Network Brownout 2004: The portrayal of Latinos and Latino issues in network television news, 2003. Austin, TX and Washington, DC: National Association of Hispanic Journalists.

Sullivan, R. E. 2003. Rap and Race—It's got a nice beat, but what about the message? *Journal of Black Studies* 33 (5):605-622.

Tamborini, R., D. E. Mastro, R. M. Chory-Assad, and R. H. Huang. 2000. The color of crime and the court: A content analysis of minority respresentation on television. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 77 (3):639-653.

Valentino, N. A. 1999. Crime news and the priming of racial attitudes during evaluations of the president. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (3):293-320.

Valentino, N. A., V. L. Hutchings, and I. K. White. 2002. Cues that matter: How political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns. *American Political Science Review* 96 (1):75-90.

Vastag, Brian. 2004. Does Video Game Violence Sow Aggression? Studies Probe Effects of Virtual Violence on Children. *Journal of the American Medical Association* 291 (15):1822-1824.

Ward, L. M. 2004. Wading through the stereotypes: Positive and negative associations between media use and black adolescents; conceptions of self. *Developmental Psychology* 40 (2):284-294.

Warner, K. 2004. Gang rape in Sydney: Crime, the media, politics, race and sentencing. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 37 (3):344-361.

Watkins, S. C. 2001. Framing protest: News media frames of the million man march. *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 18 (1):83-101.

Weitzer, R., and S. A. Tuch. 2004. Reforming the police: Racial differences in public support for change. *Criminology* 42 (2):391-416.

Welch, M., E. A. Price, and N. Yankey. 2002. Moral panic over youth violence: Wilding and the manufacture of menace in the media. *Youth & Society* 34 (1):3-30.

Westin, Av. 2001. You've got to 'Be Carefully Taught': racist encoding in the newsroom. *Nieman Reports* 55 (1):63-65.

Weston, Mary Ann. 1996. *Native Americans in the News: Images of Indians in the Twentieth Century Press*. Greenwich, CT: Greenwood, 1996.

Wilkinson, Kenton T. 2002. Collective Situational Ethnicity and Latino Subgroups' Struggle for Influence in U.S. Spanish-Language Television. *Communication Quarterly* 50 (3/4):422.

Wilson, W. J. 1996. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Knopf.

Wright, Wayne E. 2004. What English-only really means: A study of the implementation of California language policy with Cambodian-American Students. *Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 7 (1):1-23.

Wu, Frank. 2001. *Yellow*. New York: Basic Books.

Yosso, T. J. 2002. Critical race media literacy—Challenging deficit discourse about Chicanas/os. *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 30 (1):52-62.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Robert M. Entman, Ph.D., became the Shapiro Professor of Media and Public Affairs at George Washington University on January 1, 2006. Since 1994, he has been a professor of communications and political science at North Carolina State University. He earned a Ph.D. in political science as a National Science Foundation Fellow at Yale University, and taught at Duke University from 1980-89 and at Northwestern University from 1989-94. His most recent books include *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (2004)*; Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy* (edited with L. Bennett), which will be published in Chinese translation by Tsinghua University Press in 2005; and *The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America* (co-authored with A. Rojecki, 2000), which won several awards, including Harvard's Goldsmith Book Prize and the Lane Award from the American Political Science Association. For his work on media framing, he has been named the 2005 winner of the Woolbert Research Prize from the National Communication Association.

ABOUT THE JOINT CENTER HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE

The mission of the Joint Center Health Policy Institute (HPI) is to ignite a "Fair Health" movement that gives people of color the inalienable right to equal opportunity for healthy lives. HPI's goal is to help communities of color identify short-and long-term policy objectives and related activities in key areas. The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies is a national, nonprofit research and public policy institution. Founded in 1970 by black intellectuals and professionals to provide training and technical assistance to newly elected black officials, the Joint Center is recognized today as one of the nation's premier think tanks on a broad range of public policy issues of concern to African Americans and other communities of color.

STAFF ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Project management: Gail C. Christopher
                    Vice President for
                    Health, Women & Families
                    Director of the Health Policy Institute

Editing & proofing: Susanna C. Dilliplane
                     General Editor

Cover & text design: Marco A. White
                     Manager of Technology & Information

JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Togo Dennis West, Jr., President & Chief Executive Officer
Margaret C. Simms, Vice President for Governance
                    & Economic Analysis
Gail C. Christopher, Vice President for Health,
                    Women & Families,
                    Director of the Health Policy Institute
Brenda Watkins Noel, Vice President & Chief Financial Officer
Christine A. Naylor, Vice President for Corporate Relations
                    & Strategic Planning
Janice F. Joyner, Vice President for Communications & Policy